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TAX LAWYERS AS TAX INSURANCE
HEATHER M. FIELD*
ABSTRACT
Transactional tax lawyers, by rendering tax opinions, provide a
version of insurance to clients. This insurance is clearly incomplete,
but by providing a tax opinion, a lawyer conditionally agrees to
indemnify the client for at least part of the potential loss the client
incurs if the favorable tax treatment described in the opinion is
successfully challenged. Although insurance is not the primary
function of transactional tax lawyers, and although this Article does
not argue that tax opinions should be regulated as insurance,
indemnification—a key element of insurance—is an important part
of the economic relationship between a client and a lawyer who
provides a tax opinion. Surprisingly, this insurance-like function has
been largely overlooked in the literature. Thus, by identifying and
exploring the insurance-like aspect of the transactional tax lawyer’s
role, this Article fills a gap in the literature and offers a new
framework for understanding the value of tax lawyers. Additionally,
this Article argues that the insurance-like aspect of tax opinions has
important implications for the profession, potentially affecting tax
advisers’ billing practices, the terms of client engagements, the
design of tax opinions, the market for tax advice, and more.
* Professor of Law & Eucalyptus Foundation Chair, University of California Hastings
College of the Law. I appreciated the opportunity to present this project at the Association for
Mid-Career Tax Professors’ 2017 Conference, the 2018 Boston College-Tulane Tax Round-
table, the 2018 Northern California Tax Professor Roundtable, and the Law & Society Asso-
ciation’s 2018 Annual Meeting, and I thank all conference/roundtable participants, especially
Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Natalya Shnitser, and Dennis Ventry, for their input. Thanks also to Leo
Martinez and Doug Richmond. 
2111
2112 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:2111
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2114
I. TAX ADVICE, TAX OPINIONS, AND THIRD-PARTY TAX 
INSURANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2120
A. Transactional Tax Advising . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2120
1. In General. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2120
2. Tax Opinion Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2122
B. Third-Party Tax Insurance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2126
II. THE SUBSTITUTABILITY OF TAX OPINIONS AND THIRD-PARTY 
TAX INSURANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2129
III. INDICIA OF INSURANCE INHERENT IN TAX OPINIONS . . . . . 2135
A. Insurable Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2136
1. “Risk” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2136
2. “Insurable Interest” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2137
B. Transfer of Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2138
1. The Risk Transfer Is Implicit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2139
2. The Extent of the Risk Transferred Is Limited by
Requirements for Malpractice Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . 2140
a. Indemnification Is Conditional on Breach of 
Standard of Care . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2141
b. Indemnification Is Limited in Amount to 
“Damages” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2149
3. Risk Transfer Is Not the “Principle Object and 
Purpose” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2153
C. Distribution of Risk. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2155
D. Conclusion About the Applicability of the Insurance
Construct to Tax Opinions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2158
IV. THE INDEMNITY FUNCTION OF TAX OPINIONS AND THE 
REALITY OF TAX PRACTICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2160
A. Tax Malpractice Payouts as Evidence of the Indemnity
Function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2161
B. Tax Lawyers’ Perceptions About the Indemnity Function of
Tax Opinions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2166
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE INSURANCE ANALYSIS FOR TAX 
OPINIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2169
A. Tax Lawyers’ Billing Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2169
2019] TAX LAWYERS AS TAX INSURANCE 2113
1. Illustrations of the Relevance of Premium-Style 
Fees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2170
2. Questions Raised by Premium-Style Fees . . . . . . . . . . 2173
a. Are Premium-Style Fees for Tax Opinions 
Allowed? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2173
b. Other Concerns About Premium-Style Fees . . . . . . . 2177
B. Terms of Client Engagements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2178
C. The Design of Tax Opinions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2179
D. The Market for Tax Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2181
E. Conclusion About the Consequences of the Insurance
Construct for Tax Opinions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2183
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2183
2114 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:2111
INTRODUCTION
Transactional tax lawyers, by rendering tax opinions, provide an
element of insurance to clients. This insurance is clearly incom-
plete, but by providing a tax opinion, a lawyer conditionally agrees
to indemnify the client for part of the potential loss the client incurs
if the favorable tax treatment described in the opinion is success-
fully challenged. Thus, tax lawyers serve, at least partly, as tax
insurers.
This insurance function is missing from the literature about the
transactional tax lawyer’s role. Ronald J. Gilson’s seminal work,
Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing,
explains that transactional lawyers add value for clients by being
“transaction cost engineers.”1 The voluminous literature that fol-
lowed Gilson’s article provided various other explanations, con-
ceiving transactional lawyers as reputational intermediaries,2
regulatory cost reducers,3 enterprise designers,4 transaction quar-
terbacks,5 “risk managers,”6 aggregators of information about
market terms,7 and more.8 Considering transactional tax lawyers
specifically, Victor Fleischer added the role of a “regulatory arbitra-
geur,”9 who “tweak[s] a deal structure to achieve better regulatory
1. 94 YALE L.J. 239, 255 (1984).
2. See, e.g., Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REV. 15,
15, 17-19 (1995).
3. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 486, 506 (2007).
4. See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., Business Lawyers as Enterprise Architects, 64 BUS. LAW.
279, 299 (2009).
5. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Beetles, Frogs, and Lawyers: The Scientific Demarcation
Problem in the Gilson Theory of Value Creation, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 139, 143 (2009).
6. Praveen Kosuri, Beyond Gilson: The Art of Business Lawyering, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 463, 488-89 (2015).
7. See, e.g., Elisabeth de Fontenay, Law Firm Selection and the Value of Transactional
Lawyering, 41 J. CORP. L. 393, 396 (2015).
8. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, The Silicon Valley Lawyer as Transaction Cost Engineer?, 74
OR. L. REV. 239, 240 & nn.7-11 (1995) (business advisers); Therese Maynard, Teaching
Professionalism: The Lawyer as a Professional, 34 GA. L. REV. 895, 918 (2000) (someone who
is relied upon for excellent judgment); James C. Freund, Teaching Problem Solving: New
Business Lawyers Need to Know How to Find the Deal: A Lawyer’s Perspective, BUS. L. TODAY,
July/Aug. 1999, at 32, 36 (problem solvers).
9. Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 236-37 (2010).
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treatment [for example, better tax treatment, thereby shifting value
from the government to the deal parties] without unduly altering
the underlying business arrangements.”10
The insurance-like aspect of the lawyer-client relationship,
however, has been largely overlooked until now. When the insur-
ance aspect of opinions (tax or nontax) is mentioned in the litera-
ture, it is most commonly with a brief comment to the effect that “[a]
legal opinion is not an insurance policy.”11 These comments, how-
ever, are typically made to assert that an opinion does “not guaran-
tee[ ] that a court will reach any particular result.”12 But insurance
need not promise a particular result or provide for 100 percent loss
coverage if that result is not achieved. Arrangements can have
aspects of insurance without providing a full guarantee of results.
10. Victor Fleischer, Taxing Blackstone, 61 TAX L. REV. 89, 94 (2008); see also Fleischer,
supra note 9, at 240.
11. Charles R. Beaudrot, Jr., Transactional Skills Training: Opinion Letters,
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 405, 410 (2009) (discussing nontax third-party opinions); see
also Robert P. Rothman, Tax Opinion Practice, 64 TAX LAW. 301, 326 (2011) (citing M. JOHN
STERBA, JR., LEGAL OPINION LETTERS § 12.9 (3d ed. 2003) (discussing tax opinions)). Examples
of such comments arise in the general (as opposed to tax-specific) context. See, e.g., DONALD
W. GLAZER ET AL., GLAZER & FITZGIBBON ON LEGAL OPINIONS: DRAFTING, INTERPRETING AND
SUPPORTING CLOSING OPINIONS IN BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 15 (3d ed. 2008) (“Another benefit
sometimes ascribed—wrongly—to a closing opinion is that it serves as an insurance policy.”);
STERBA, supra, § 12.12 (3d ed. 2018 Supp.) (“[L]awyers are not insurers of their opinions in
the absence of an express agreement, [but] a nonspecialist who practices in a specialized field
may end up as a de facto insurer of his or her work.”); Comm. on Legal Ops., Third-Party
Legal Opinion Report, Including the Legal Opinion Accord, of the Section of Business Law,
American Bar Association, 47 BUS. LAW. 167, 171 (1991) (“By rendering a professional opinion,
the opinion giver does not become an insurer or guarantor of the expression of professional
judgment.”). Examples also arise in the tax context. See, e.g., Frederic G. Corneel, Guidelines
to Tax Practice Third, 57 TAX LAW. 181, 184 (2003) (commenting that in the tax context, “[a]n
opinion is rarely an insurance policy”); Calvin H. Johnson, Ending Reliance on Tax Opinions
of the Taxpayer’s Own Lawyer, 141 TAX NOTES 947, 948 (2013) (“Tax advisers are not
insurers.”); Robert G. Woodward, Tax Opinions, 2010 ABA TAX-CLE 0923078 (citing
Committee on Legal Opinions, supra, at 171).
12. Comm. on Legal Ops., Legal Opinion Principles, 53 BUS. LAW. 831, 832 (1998); see also,
e.g., Comm. on Legal Ops., supra note 11, at 171; Rothman, supra note 11, at 326
(commenting that in the tax context “even a ‘will’ level opinion does not guarantee absolute
certainty”); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured
Finance, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1, 42 (2005) (“Opining lawyers ... are not ... the ultimate guarantors
of legality.”); TriBar Op. Comm., Third-Party “Closing” Opinions, 53 BUS. LAW. 592, 596
(1998); cf. Johnson, supra note 11, at 948 (“Tax advisers ... do not promise to pay the
taxpayer’s tax if the opinion fails.”).
2116 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:2111
Thus, the brief assertions in the literature about opinions not being
insurance are too conclusory.
The literature includes rare acknowledgments of the possibility
that opinions contain insurance-like features. In the tax area, com-
mentators occasionally mention that tax opinions may serve as
“‘insurance’ against penalties.”13 These commentators typically put
the word “insurance” in quotations and imply that tax opinions
create a form of government-provided insurance because having an
opinion may protect a client from penalties that the client would
otherwise owe to the government.14 These commentators do not,
however, seem to contemplate the possibility that the client will
recover from the lawyer if penalties are imposed.15
Outside the tax area, few commentators acknowledge the pos-
sibility of an insurance-like role for opinion-writing lawyers.16 Of
the two commentators who come closest, albeit in a nontax context,
to the assertions made in this Article, one briefly—in three sen-
tences—raises and sets aside the possibility that business lawyers
could add value for a client by taking on some of the client’s risk
13. Jeffrey Morse & Marnin Michaels, The Changing Role of the International Tax and
Estate Planning Practitioner: Pasquantino, Circular 230—What’s Next?, 16 J. INT’L TAX’N 46,
51 (2005); see also, e.g., Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, COBRA Strikes Back:
Anatomy of a Tax Shelter, 62 TAX LAW. 59, 65 n.27 (2008) (criticizing the marketing of tax
opinions as “insurance”—a tool for “shielding a taxpayer from the 20% substantial-
understatement penalty”); Leandra Lederman, A Tisket, A Tasket: Basketing and Corporate
Tax Shelters, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 557, 603 (2011) (noting that the revisions to Circular 230
were intended to “limit the use of tax opinions as ‘penalty insurance’ for shelters”); Charles
H. Egerton, ABA Members Seek More Guidance on Codification of Economic Substance
Doctrine, 2011 TAX NOTES TODAY 12-13 (Jan. 18, 2011) (discussing efforts to “dissuade[ ]
taxpayers from viewing opinions as ‘penalty insurance’”).
14. See, e.g., Morse & Michaels, supra note 13, at 51.
15. See, e.g., id. at 49-52 (discussing possible adverse consequences, including fines,
censure, disbarment and even criminal sanctions, for a lawyer who renders tax opinions, but
never mentioning the possibility that a client could recover from a lawyer on account of the
tax opinion).
16. Other commentators describe a “lawyer-as-insurer” role where the lawyer drafts
detailed contracts that shift risk among parties to the deal but not to the lawyer herself. See
Robert A. Kagan & Robert Eli Rosen, On the Social Significance of Large Law Firm Practice,
37 STAN. L. REV. 399, 415-17 (1985). Another “lawyer-as-insurer” concept contemplates the
opinion-writing lawyer primarily as a guarantor to third parties of the veracity of the client’s
representations. See Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator:
Lawyers and the Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
679, 694-97 (1996).
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via the possibility of a malpractice claim.17 The other commentator,
who provides a slightly longer discussion in two separate articles,18
approached third-party closing opinion practice primarily through
a sociological study rather than through a detailed legal analysis as
provided herein.19 His findings offer a relatively limited account of
the insurance role of third-party closing opinions,20 but he suggested
that the insurance-like function of closing opinions may increase in
the future.21 Moreover, he implied that tax opinions, in contrast to
third-party closing opinions that were his focus, might be a special
case.22
The absence of meaningful scholarly attention to the insurance-
like function of tax lawyers is surprising because, as this Article
demonstrates, the risk shifting from clients to tax opinion-givers
can be meaningful and can affect important aspects of the lawyer/
client relationship. Specifically, understanding tax opinions through
an insurance lens can affect tax advisers’ billing practices, the terms
of client engagements, the design of tax opinions, the market for tax
advice, and more. Appreciating the tax lawyer’s indemnification role
is especially important now, after the enactment of the most sweep-
ing tax changes in more than thirty years.23 The new tax laws bring
tremendous uncertainty, which means that clients will be even more
dependent on guidance (including opinions) from their tax ad-
visers.24 Thus, this Article fills the gap in the literature by identifying,
17. See Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 493, 495 (dismissing the insurance construct because
of hurdles to malpractice recovery, because there are more effective ways for clients to protect
against bad outcomes, and because insurance-like risk-shifting was outside the scope of the
article).
18. See Jonathan C. Lipson, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Third-Party Opinion Practice, 63
BUS. LAW. 1187, 1201-03 (2008) [hereinafter Lipson, CBA]; Jonathan C. Lipson, Price, Path
& Pride: Third-Party Closing Opinion Practice among U.S. Lawyers (A Preliminary
Investigation), 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 59, 102-09, 124 (2005) [hereinafter Lipson, Price].
19. See Lipson, Price, supra note 18, at 127.
20. Very generally, he concluded that third-party opinion practice places the lawyer “in
harm’s way to a greater extent than in perhaps any other aspect of business law practice,” but
that concern about reputation and other considerations, rather than fears about liability, may
feel more pressing to these lawyers. See id. at 104-05, 108-13, 124.
21. See id. at 65.
22. See Lipson, CBA, supra note 18, at 1201.
23. See generally Act of Dec. 22, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) (to be
codified in 26 U.S.C.).
24. See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, Transatlantic Tax Planning Tips, 94 TAX NOTES INT’L 477,
477 (2018) (“Even with the U.S. Treasury’s yeoman efforts to issue TCJA guidance,
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exploring, and explaining the consequences of the insurance-like
aspect of the transactional tax lawyer’s role.
This Article examines only transactional tax lawyers, and leaves
for future study how the insurance-like paradigm resonates in other
transactional practices. It is certainly possible that transactional
lawyers in practice areas outside of tax may also serve an in-
surance-like function when they provide opinions. This Article,
however, focuses on the tax context, both because of my expertise
and because of features of tax law and tax practice (for example, the
centrality of tax opinions to tax practice,25 the history of profes-
sional liability payouts related to tax shelters and tax shelter
opinions,26 and Circular 230’s detailed ethical obligations applicable
only to tax practice27) that may cause the indemnity function of
opinions to have particular resonance in the tax context.
To be clear, this Article does not argue that the primary or
predominant function of transactional tax lawyers is to provide
insurance, nor does this Article assert that tax opinions, or their
providers, should be regulated as insurance (or insurers). Rather,
this Article argues that indemnification (in other words, one
element of insurance) is part of the economic relationship between
a client and a lawyer who provides a tax opinion, and that the
insurance paradigm is an important additional lens through which
to understand the role of transactional tax lawyers and the value
they provide.
Moreover, this Article acknowledges that the risk shifting ac-
complished by tax opinions is neither unidirectional nor complete.
Tax opinions, by creating penalty-free zones in some cases,28 can
also shift some of the risks and costs of incorrect positions from the
taxpayer to the government. And given the barriers to malpractice
recoveries and how carefully tax opinions are often written to pro-
tect the opinion writer, a taxpayer does retain a significant portion
of the risk for taking positions that are successfully challenged.29
practitioners on both sides of the Atlantic face uncertainty in advising on cross-border
transactions and structures.”).
25. See infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 261-63 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
28. See supra note 13.
29. The liability arising from an unsuccessful tax position falls on the taxpayer who took
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Yet, as this Article demonstrates, tax opinions do shift some portion
of that risk from the taxpayer to the opinion writer.
In addition, this Article’s claim is descriptive, not normative.
Should tax lawyers be required (or allowed) to indemnify their cli-
ents for the liability arising from successful challenges to tax
positions on which the lawyers opined? Should the law be adjusted
to emphasize or deemphasize the tax lawyer’s indemnification obli-
gation? Would increasing the extent to which and frequency with
which tax advisors indemnify their clients (for example, by lowering
the hurdles to malpractice recoveries or increasing the damages that
are recoverable)30 cause advisors to give more conservative advice,
thereby increasing tax compliance? Or would doing so hinder com-
pliance by encouraging taxpayers to take riskier positions than they
otherwise would because of their ability to recover the costs from
their advisors if the positions are wrong?31 Are tax lawyers effective
at managing and distributing risks of client losses or should the
large-scale transfer and distribution of tax risks be left to third-
party tax insurers? If the latter, does that portend a rise in the
market for third-party tax insurers and a decline in tax opinions?
These important questions are outside the scope of this Article.
They cannot be answered without first examining the extent to
which transactional tax lawyers are currently serving an in-
surance-like role. Only once that baseline is understood can
normative questions be engaged effectively. This Article, by
identifying that and explaining the extent to which transactional
tax lawyers serve an insurance-like function, provides a critical step
in understanding and evaluating the risk-shifting dynamic between
clients and their tax lawyers.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides background on
transactional tax practice in general, tax opinion practice specifi-
cally, and tax insurance available from third-party insurers. Part II
the position. Thus, when discussing the potential shifting of that risk, this Article will gen-
erally discuss any such risk ultimately borne by the taxpayer as being “retained” by the
taxpayer and will discuss any risk borne by another party as being “shifted” to that party. 
30. See Jay A. Soled, Tax Shelter Malpractice Cases and Their Implications for Tax
Compliance, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 267, 316-22, 326-27 (2008).
31. See 1 NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION § 1.01[4][b] (Jeffrey E.
Thomas ed., 2017) [hereinafter APPLEMAN] (explaining that insurance can create a moral
hazard).
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draws an analogy between tax opinions and third-party tax
insurance to demonstrate how the former are similar to the latter.
Part III examines the extent to which tax opinions reflect tradi-
tional indicia of insurance. Part IV discusses evidence, including
from malpractice insurance claims data, illustrating how the in-
demnity function of tax opinions resonates in the reality of tax
practice. Part V discusses several implications of understanding
the tax lawyer/client relationship through the insurance lens.
I. TAX ADVICE, TAX OPINIONS, AND THIRD-PARTY TAX INSURANCE
This Part provides background on the role of transactional tax
advisers, tax opinion practice, and third-party tax insurance.
A. Transactional Tax Advising
Transactional tax lawyers provide clients with tax advice on a
wide variety of matters, including corporate mergers, acquisitions
and dispositions (domestic and cross-border); acquisitions/disposi-
tions of major assets; choice of entity decisions; internal restruc-
turings and transfer pricing for multi-national enterprises; real
estate transactions (including REIT formation/qualification and
Section 1031 exchanges); capital markets transactions; structured
finance transactions; fund formation/operations (for example, for
private equity funds or hedge funds); tax-equity investing transac-
tions (for example, involving monetization of tax credits); qualifica-
tion for favorable tax status (for example, as a Section 501(c)(3)
organization or an S corporation); the availability of particular tax
benefits (for example, deductions); and, of course, tax avoidance/
shelter transactions. All of these transactions have material tax
consequences and potential liability if the tax planning is success-
fully challenged, so good tax advice is critical.
1. In General
In these transactions, the tax lawyer will typically analyze the
transaction and work with the client and other lawyers to try to
structure the matter to achieve the client’s business goals while
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minimizing tax costs.32 The lawyer will inform the client about the
tax consequences that arise from the transaction’s structure, ad-
vise the client about opportunities for improving the tax treatment,
and counsel the client about the risks and benefits of different
approaches, all as part of helping the client determine whether and
how to proceed.33 The transactional tax lawyer may also render a
formal tax opinion about the tax consequences, and the tax lawyer
may discuss with the client the possibility of obtaining tax insur-
ance.34
In addition, a transactional tax lawyer also often helps implement
the transaction. For example, a transactional tax lawyer typically
drafts and negotiates the tax representations, warranties, cove-
nants, and other tax-related provisions in the agreement(s) govern-
ing the transaction. The transactional tax lawyer may conduct, or
at least review, tax diligence about target businesses/assets and
help the client mitigate (for example, through additional represen-
tations or indemnities) any risks that are revealed.35 If the matter
involves soliciting investors or asking shareholders to vote, a
disclosure document describing the transaction will typically be
prepared, and the transactional tax lawyer will draft the tax
portions of the disclosure document, explaining the material tax
consequences of the investing, voting, or other choice presented.36
Through these actions and more, transactional tax lawyers add
value for clients in many of the ways described in the literature.37
32. See generally Heather M. Field, Giving Useful Tax Planning Advice, 134 TAX NOTES
1299, 1302 (2012) (explaining that part of the role of a tax advisor, particularly on
transactional matters, is to “help [the] client achieve its business objectives in tax-efficient
ways”).
33. See generally id. at 1302-03.
34. See infra Parts III.A.2 & III.B.
35. Cf. generally 5 MARTIN D. GINSBURG ET AL., MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND BUYOUTS
(Dec. 2018) (providing a variety of sample transaction agreements from buyer, seller, and
neutral perspectives, with annotations, to assist tax lawyers as they draft and negotiate deal
documents).
36. Cf. Omri Marian, Reconciling Tax Law and Securities Regulation, 48 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 1, 6-10 (2014) (discussing considerations relevant to the requirements for, and the
contents of, tax disclosures).
37. For example, she helps the client manage tax risks, including by drafting and nego-
tiating contractual provisions (such as representations, warranties, and indemnities) that
shift risk away from the client to other parties in the transaction. See Kosuri, supra note 6,
at 466-81.
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2. Tax Opinion Practice
Tax opinions are an important part of the practice of a trans-
actional tax lawyer. A tax opinion is a formal written statement of
the law firm’s opinion about the tax consequences of the matter.38
Although many types of written advice can express tax opinions,39
formal opinions are said to be “the pinnacle of legal advice.”40 They
are a “central part of a tax adviser’s practice,”41 and their promi-
nence is expected to grow even more.42
Formal tax opinions generally use a common structure. They are
generally rendered on the firm’s letterhead, and they typically
describe the role of the lawyer, the materials reviewed, and the
purpose of the opinion.43 They include disclaimers; a description of
the facts, representations, and assumptions on which the opinion is
based; the legal analysis (for complex or uncertain matters); the
statement of certainty about the tax treatment; and any restric-
tions on use of the opinion.44 These opinions often rely on lawyer-
drafted representation letters or certificates signed by the client and
other parties to the transaction, in which the client and other par-
ties attest to a variety of factual matters relevant to the lawyer’s
analysis.45
When preparing tax opinions, lawyers must comply with the
applicable ethical constraints,46 including the standards of practice
38. See Rothman, supra note 11, at 301-11; Woodward, supra note 11, at 3.
39. See STERBA, supra note 11, § 1.1; Robert W. Wood, Liability for Tax Opinions: What’s
an Opinion and Who Can Sue?, TAXES, Jan. 2008, at 53-54.
40. Rothman, supra note 11, at 301.
41. Woodward, supra note 11, at 4. But cf. Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 488 n.15, 531
(finding that opinion practice constituted only approximately 5-15 percent of transactional
lawyers’ work, although reaching this finding in a study that did not include transactional tax
lawyers).
42. See Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Tax Opinion Practice Today, 145 TAX NOTES 1049, 1049
(2014) (tax opinions are “on the rise”). 
43. See Rothman, supra note 11, at 361-66.
44. See id.; see also LINDA GALLER & MICHAEL B. LANG, REGULATION OF TAX PRACTICE 150
(2d ed. 2016); Woodward, supra note 11, at 20-22.
45. See Cummings, supra note 42, at 1049 (critiquing how tax certificates are prepared
for use in opinion practice).
46. See, e.g., ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985)
(regarding advising on reporting positions); ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility,
Formal Op. 346 (1982) (regarding tax advice for marketed tax shelters).
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articulated in IRS Circular 230,47 which includes specific require-
ments for written tax advice.48 The practitioner’s analysis for a tax
opinion typically requires significant effort,49 and opinions, includ-
ing tax opinions, are often subject to heightened risk management
procedures in law firms (for example, approval by a firm’s opinion
committee).50
The key part of a tax opinion is the statement pertaining to the
firm’s confidence in the tax treatment of the transaction. Opinions
are rendered at various levels of confidence.51 Terms of art are used
to articulate the firm’s confidence about how likely it is that a par-
ticular tax treatment will be sustained on the merits if challenged.52
Levels of comfort range from “will” on the high end (approximately
95 percent or greater chance of success on the merits)53 to “reason-
able basis” on the lower end54 (approximately 20-30 percent chance
of success on the merits).55 Opinions are also commonly rendered at
“should” (approximately 70-75 percent), “more likely than not”
(greater than 50 percent), and “substantial authority” (approximate-
ly 35-40 percent) levels, and opinion levels are sometimes qualified
with phrases such as “although not free from doubt.”56
47. 31 C.F.R. § 10 (2017) [hereinafter Circular 230].
48. Id. § 10.37.
49. See Dennis J. Ventry, Jr. & Bradley T. Borden, Probability, Professionalism, and Pro-
tecting Taxpayers, 68 TAX LAW. 83, 94-95 (2014). 
50. See Woodward, supra note 11, at 35-36; see also Circular 230 § 10.36 (procedures to
ensure compliance with tax practitioners’ ethical obligations). See generally Legal Ops. Comm.
of the ABA Section of Bus. Law, Report on the 2010 Survey of Law Firm Opinion Practices,
68 BUS. LAW. 785, 787-93 (2013) (discussing firms’ opinion procedures for nontax opinions).
51. See Rothman, supra note 11, at 311.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 312, 327.
54. See GALLER & LANG, supra note 44, at 151. An opinion could also be rendered at a “not
frivolous” level, which might reflect around a 5-10 percent chance of success on the merits, but
this opinion level is relatively uncommon. See Ventry & Borden, supra note 49, at 89; see also
Rothman, supra note 11, at 324-25 (describing “not frivolous” as “the lowest level at which
there is some modicum of comfort as to a position,” and noting that “the not frivolous standard
does not come up very often in the context of formal opinions”).
55. See Rothman, supra note 11, at 322-24, 327; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3)
(defining “reasonable basis”).
56. See GALLER & LANG, supra note 44, at 150-53; see also Rothman, supra note 11, at 312-
27. Some of these opinion levels are explicitly defined in the regulations. See, e.g., Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6662-3(b)(3) (2017) (defining “reasonable basis”); id. § 1.6662-4(d) (defining “substantial
authority”).
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Formal tax opinions are used for a variety of purposes.57 Opinions
can be used to provide the client with comfort about the tax con-
sequences of the transaction.58 Opinions may satisfy a contractual
condition; for example, the closing of a corporate acquisition may be
conditioned on the receipt of a tax opinion that the acquisition will
qualify as a tax-free reorganization within the meaning of Section
368 of the Code.59 Opinions are also used to induce others to take a
particular action (for example, invest).60 Opinions are sometimes
sought to assist clients in defending against the possible imposition
of penalties if the desired tax treatment is not sustained.61 And tax
opinions are increasingly used to provide information needed for
determining how an uncertain tax position should be reflected on a
company’s financial statements under Financial Accounting
Standards Board Interpretation Number 48 (FIN 48).62
The purpose of the opinion will often dictate the minimum con-
fidence level at which the client wants the opinion to be rendered.63
For example, if an opinion will be used to solicit third parties to
invest, the strength of the tax opinion may affect the pricing of the
deal (because investors might pay less if the tax benefits are less
certain), so a stronger opinion may be preferred.64 Under FIN 48, a
taxpayer cannot book an uncertain tax benefit at all if the tax
benefit is not “more likely than not” to be sustained.65 And to assist
with penalty protection, the tax position generally needs to be
supported by “reasonable basis,” “substantial authority,” or more.66
57. See GALLER & LANG, supra note 44, at 150-51; see also Rothman, supra note 11, at 301-
11; Woodward, supra note 11, at 13-19.
58. See Rothman, supra note 11, at 302.
59. See Woodard, supra note 11, at 13. All references to the “Code” in this Article refer to
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
60. See Rothman, supra note 11, at 303-04.
61. See id. at 307-08.
62. See id. at 308-09.
63. See Heather M. Field, Aggressive Tax Planning & the Ethical Tax Lawyer, 36 VA. TAX
REV. 261, 271-74 (2017) (summarizing the consequences of tax opinion levels).
64. See id. at 274.
65. See FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., FASB Interpretation No. 48: Accounting for
Uncertainty in Income Taxes, An Interpretation of FASB Statement No. 109, FIN. ACC. Series
No. 281-B (June 2006).
66. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B) (2017) (reducing the taxpayer’s accuracy-related
penalty for substantial understatement if a position had substantial authority or, if disclosed,
had reasonable basis). If the transaction is a tax shelter, substantial authority or reasonable
basis is generally not enough. Id. § 6662(d)(2)(C). The availability of penalty reduction is
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Clients, even clients who seek formal tax opinions to assist with
penalty protection, generally want the favorable tax treatment
described in the opinion to be sustained.67 If the tax position ad-
dressed in the opinion is not sustained, a client wants protection
from penalties, but a rational client generally prefers that the tax
position be sustained in the first instance so that the favorable tax
treatment is obtained and penalties do not become an issue.68
Regardless of the purpose for which the tax opinion was obtain-
ed, if the tax treatment described in the formal tax opinion is not
sustained, the client is likely to be unhappy and may sue the
lawyer.69 These are generally malpractice cases,70 commonly on tort
based on whether the particular tax position actually had the articulated level of support, and
not on what an opinion may have said about the strength of the position. See id.
§ 6662(d)(2)(B). However, the opinion can establish the legal basis for concluding that a
position has the requisite support. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d) (2017). In some
circumstances, tax opinions can also be relied upon to enable a “reasonable cause” and “good
faith” reduction of the taxpayer’s penalty. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (2017). But see infra
notes 346-49 and accompanying text (discussing limits on taxpayer reliance on an opinion to
reduce penalties).
67. See Robert W. Wood, What Good is a Tax Opinion, Anyway?, 128 TAX NOTES 1071,
1071 (2010). Clients also care about contest costs. Ideally, clients prefer the position not be
contested at all, so that the desired tax treatment is obtained and no controversy costs are
incurred. However, if there is a controversy, the client would like to prevail while minimizing
controversy costs. Cf. id. An opinion may help expedite the controversy process, thereby
reducing contest costs.
68. See id.
69. See STERBA, supra note 11, § 12.1.
70. See, e.g., ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y, RECENT CLAIMS TRENDS IN THE TAX
PRACTICE 1-4 (2011) [hereinafter ALAS], http://cc.talkpoint.com/alas001/40522/written.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G4BU-MVLF] (discussing tax malpractice claims that arise from tax
opinions related to tax shelters and “taxpayer’s disappointment in how a transaction played
out”); DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND ET AL., THE AON CLAIMS EXPERIENCE 7 (2015), https://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/professional_responsibility/2017%20Meetings/Co
nference/conference_materials/session5_mistakes_coping_ethically/summer_2015_qar.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HY7B-TACM] (describing Aon’s malpractice claims experience and citing
“allegedly faulty tax opinions” as examples of “substantive errors” alleged in malpractice
claims). See generally Jacob L. Todres, Malpractice and the Tax Practitioner: An Analysis of
the Areas in Which Malpractice Occurs, 48 EMORY L.J. 547 (1999) [hereinafter Todres I]; Jacob
L. Todres, Tax Malpractice: Areas in Which it Occurs and the Measure of Damages—An
Update, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1011 (2004) [hereinafter Todres II]; Jacob L. Todres, Tax
Malpractice Damages: A Comprehensive Review of the Elements and the Issues, 61 TAX LAW
705 (2008) [hereinafter Todres III]; Jacob L. Todres, Bad Tax Shelters—Accountability or the
Lack Thereof: Ten Years of Tax Malpractice, 66 BAYLOR L. REV. 602 (2014) [hereinafter
Todres IV).
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(negligence) or contract grounds.71 Briefly, for a malpractice action
to succeed under either a tort or contract theory, the lawyer gener-
ally must have failed to meet the standard of care, which requires
the “exercise [of] reasonable competence and diligence.”72 Damages
sought typically include
additional taxes resulting from ... malpractice [which may be
less than the total taxes that the taxpayer owes if such taxes
were unavoidable and thus not the result of the adviser’s
negligence], interest and penalties ... and corrective costs in-
curred in attempting to eliminate or mitigate all or some of the
foregoing damages.73
There is evidence of recoveries on tax malpractice claims,74 and in
particular, there have been some very high-profile malpractice
claims (and payouts) for failed tax shelter opinions.75
B. Third-Party Tax Insurance
For some matters, clients will obtain tax insurance from a third-
party insurance company that is not otherwise involved in the
transaction. This insurance, which goes by various names includ-
ing tax liability insurance, tax risk insurance, and tax indemnity
71. See Todres III, supra note 70, at 708. The claim of attorney liability may also be based
on federal securities law if the opinion was part of materials used in a securities offering. See
Wood, supra note 39, at 59-61. Practitioners can also be subject to a wide variety of other
adverse consequences as a result of a bad tax opinion, including
disciplinary action by state or federal authorities, a civil suit under any number
of legal theories, including aiding and abetting liability, RICO statutes, unfair
trade practice laws, wire or mail fraud, or securities laws, or other common law
theories, penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, criminal prosecution by
state or federal authorities.
STERBA, supra note 11, at § 12.1 (footnotes omitted). 
72. Todres II, supra note 70, at 1016; see infra Part III.B.2.a.
73. Todres III, supra note 70, at 712; see also infra Part III.B.2.b.
74. See Todres IV, supra note 70, at 606-07; see also infra Part IV.A.
75. See, e.g., Denney v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 230 F.R.D. 317, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (de-
scribing a class-action settlement in which malpractice carriers paid out over $70 million, the
firm paid $5.25 million, and individual defendants paid $6.25 million); see also Soled, supra
note 30, at 332 (providing a table detailing tax malpractice claims against high-profile
defendants).
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insurance,76 is a tax-specific form of transaction insurance.77 Briefly,
third-party tax insurance78 is a contract between a taxpayer and an
insurance company pursuant to which the taxpayer pays a premium
to the insurer, and in exchange, the insurer agrees to indemnify the
taxpayer from losses that arise if the insured tax treatment is suc-
cessfully challenged.79
Third-party tax insurance may be available for a wide variety of
matters, including “tax-free reorganizations/mergers, Section 355
spin-offs, REITs/real estate acquisitions/sales, S corp qualification/
338(h)(10) elections, partnership issues, employee benefits issues
(including 409A), NOLs, federal or state tax credits (renewable
energy ITC, low income housing, etc.), and transfer pricing.”80 Tax
insurers typically will not, however, provide insurance for tax shel-
ters, reportable or listed transactions, “abusive schemes” or “weakly
supported tax positions.”81
The process for obtaining tax insurance is often relatively brief
and can be completed in as little as fifteen days.82 Typically, a
taxpayer seeking insurance submits information about the transac-
tion (for example, tax analysis done by the taxpayer’s lawyer) to
insurers to obtain a quote for the coverage.83 Assuming at least one
insurer indicates interest in providing the insurance,84 the taxpayer
76. See Jeffrey H. Kahn, Hedging the IRS—A Policy Justification for Excluding Liability
and Insurance Proceeds, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 2 & n.4 (2009); Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law
Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 VA. TAX REV. 339, 343 (2005).
77. See generally 4 APPLEMAN, supra note 31, at § 32.01 (discussing various transactional
insurance products).
78. This Article will generally refer to tax insurance obtained from an insurance company
as “third-party tax insurance” to clarify that the insurance is not provided by a party (for
example, the lawyer) who is otherwise involved in the underlying transaction. 
79. See 4 APPLEMAN, supra note 31, § 32.03; Richard A. Wolfe, Tax Indemnity Insurance:
A Valuable and Evolving Tool for Managing Tax Risks, in 28 THE CORPORATE TAX PRACTICE
SERIES: STRATEGIES FOR ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES,
FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS ch. 445, at 445-22 to -45 (Louis S.
Freeman ed., Tax Law and Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. J-954, 2014).
80. DANIEL SCHOENBERG, AON, THE COMMERCIAL, STRATEGIC, AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
OF TAX INSURANCE: HOW, WHEN AND WHERE TO USE IT 5 (Mar. 2016).
81. Letter from David S. De Berry, Vice President, The Hartford, to the Internal Revenue
Serv., 2003 TAX NOTES TODAY 3-57 (commenting on Temporary Regulation § 1.6011-4T); see
also 4 APPLEMAN, supra note 31, § 32.03[5][a].
82. SCHOENBERG, supra note 80, at 7.
83. Id.
84. See Kahn, supra note 76, at 7 (reporting a tax insurance industry professional’s es-
timate that “over half of tax insurance applications are refused”). 
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selects an insurer. Then, the insurer engages in a more detailed
review of the transaction and its tax analysis,85 and the insurer and
the taxpayer negotiate the details of the policy that the insurer is
underwriting.86 The lump-sum charged for the insurance is typically
a small percentage of the policy limits.87
If the insured tax treatment is successfully challenged, the policy
requires the insurer to indemnify the taxpayer for losses, which
typically include “(i) any taxes legally owed by the insured arising
solely from an insured tax event; plus (ii) any interest[,] penalties,
contest expenses and gross-up.”88 The insured taxpayer typically
retains responsibility for a certain amount of losses before the in-
surer becomes responsible (in other words, a retention or deduct-
ible), and the coverage provided by the indemnity is typically subject
to a cap.89 Each policy will specify a period, typically tied to the
statute of limitations for the tax issue, during which the insured
can make a claim.90 Third-party tax insurance policies generally do
not impose a duty on the insurer to defend the insured tax treat-
ment from a government challenge, but the tax insurer does
typically retain the right to approve any settlement of a contest.91 In
addition, if the tax insurer covers a taxpayer’s losses, the insurer
often has the right to pursue a subrogation claim against the
taxpayer’s adviser who advised on, and who may have written an
opinion on, the insured matter.92
More broadly, third-party tax insurance is typically used as a risk
management strategy because it “can help a company reduce or
eliminate an unwanted or contingent liability arising from a suc-
cessful challenge by ... the IRS and/or other taxing authority of a
85. SCHOENBERG, supra note 80, at 7.
86. Id. at 7.
87. See id. at 9, 13 (giving examples with premiums less than 5 percent); Laura Davison,
Tax Insurers Eye Mega-Deals as Sector Hits $1 Billion Mark, BLOOMBERG BNA (Nov. 28,
2016), https://www.bna.com/tax-insurers-eye-n73014447652/ [https://perma.cc/T2E7-GBDK]
(“[P]remiums usually cost about 4 percent to 7 percent of the policy coverage.”).
88. 4 APPLEMAN, supra note 31, § 32.03[3]. “A ‘Gross-Up’ means the amount by which a
payment under the policy must be increased to take into account any federal income taxes
which will be imposed on the insured in respect of such payment.” Id. § 32.03[2].
89. Wolfe, supra note 79, at 445-25 to -30.
90. See 4 APPLEMAN, supra note 31, § 32.03[7].
91. Id. § 32.03[4]; Wolfe, supra note 79, at 445-41 to -45.
92. See 4 APPLEMAN, supra note 31, § 32.03[12]; Logue, supra note 76, at 389.
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company’s tax treatment of a current, pending or historical transac-
tion or investment.”93
Although tax liability insurance has been around for a long
time,94 it has historically been relatively uncommon in the United
States,95 but the industry has grown significantly in recent years96
and is expected to continue to grow.97
II. THE SUBSTITUTABILITY OF TAX OPINIONS AND THIRD-PARTY TAX
INSURANCE
Although there are differences between tax opinions and third-
party tax insurance policies, both are used by taxpayers to obtain
the comfort needed to allow them to proceed with their trans-
actions despite tax uncertainty.98 Thus, both tax opinions and
93. SCHOENBERG, supra note 80, at 4; see also PETER ROSEN & GARY BLITZ, AM. COLL.
COVERAGE & EXTRACONTRACTUAL COUNSEL, TRENDS AND FEATURES OF TRANSACTIONAL
LIABILITY INSURANCE AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE M&A MARKETPLACE 2 (2017), https://accec.
memberclicks.net/assets/LawSchoolSymposium-UMich/accec_symposium_2017michigan_
papers_transactionalliability_rosen.pdf [https://perma.cc/BQX7-DSX2] (“A tax indemnity
policy can be used to improve the odds of execution by bridging the gap between a buyer’s
evaluation of a particular tax issue and the seller’s evaluation of the same issue.”).
94. Tax insurance dates back to “the early 1980’s, when Lloyd’s of London first provided
tax insurance for leasing transactions.” ROSEN & BLITZ, supra note 93, at 2.
95. See id. at 2 (noting that early liability insurance was limited and not of much use);
Logue, supra note 76, at 343-44 (noting in 2005 that, “tax risk insurance is a recent develop-
ment and is still only a niche market” but that “there are reports that the tax indemnity
insurance market is growing rapidly”).
96. As of 2016, the tax insurance industry has grown enough to underwrite a policy as big
as $1 billion. Davison, supra note 87 (remarking that “[t]hese insurance policies are
graduating from middle-market deals”). The aggregate value of policy limits has also risen
fairly dramatically, even since 2013. For example, Aon’s transactional liability insurance
policy limits (including tax and nontax transaction insurance) totaled approximately $2.1
billion in 2013 and approximately $12.6 billion in 2016. ROSEN & BLITZ, supra note 93, at 3
(explaining that, in 2016, tax insurance policies comprised almost 20 percent of the $12.6
billion policy limits, implying that the tax insurance policy limits alone totaled approximately
$2.5 billion in 2016). Part of this growth is attributed to streamlined diligence processes and
the addition of new insurers to the marketplace. Id. In addition, Revenue Procedure 2014-12
identified tax insurance as a preferred strategy for managing risks for tax credit equity
investments, which may give taxpayers more confidence in the value of using tax insurance.
See Davison, supra note 87 (discussing the revenue procedure).
97. See Davison, supra note 87 (commenting, in 2016, that “[t]he industry is at the
‘precipice’ of being discussed in the boardrooms of large publicly traded companies,” and
quoting an industry insider as saying, “[t]here is a lot of runway left in this [tax insurance]
market”).
98. See SCHOENBERG, supra note 80, at 6 (articulating reasons for using third-party tax
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third-party tax insurance policies help taxpayers manage risks
associated with uncertain tax positions.99
Moreover, both function as, and are discussed as, alternatives to
obtaining private letter rulings (PLRs) from the government.100 Of
course, neither a tax opinion nor a third-party insurance policy is
binding on the government, and so both contemplate that the de-
sired tax treatment might not be sustained.101 However, both are
perceived to provide more certainty about the tax consequences
than a taxpayer would have without either.102 Taxpayers typically
rely on tax opinions and/or third-party tax insurance, rather than
PLRs, if, for example, the transaction is on a timeline that is too fast
to allow for obtaining a PLR, which typically takes several
months.103 In addition, taxpayers commonly use these alternatives
to get tax comfort on the many issues on which the IRS will not
provide PLRs.104 The decline in areas in which the IRS will provide
insurance); Woodward, supra note 11, at 13 (“[V]ery generally, the purpose of a tax opinion
is to provide the opinion giver’s client with some level ... of comfort or assurance regarding the
tax treatment or consequences relating to a particular transaction or series of transactions.”).
99. Taxpayers use other risk management tools as well, including representations, war-
ranties, and indemnities, which shift risk among the parties to the transaction rather than
between the client and the lawyer. See Kahn, supra note 76, at 7; Logue, supra note 76, at
385-86. Other tools for risk-shifting among the taxpayer and its tax advisor include tax
advisors warranties, which generally operate as money-back guarantees that give the tax-
payer a refund of some or all of the fees paid to the adviser if the tax benefit is not obtained;
these warranties are generally limited to fees paid (plus sometimes interest and penalties)
but do not generally cover broader losses that may arise from the adviser’s error. See Kahn,
supra note 76, at 5; Logue, supra note 76, at 382-83.
100. See, e.g., Robert W. Wood, Tax Opinion or Private Letter Ruling? A 12-Point Com-
parison, 149 TAX NOTES 835 (2015) (discussing the choice between tax opinions and PLRs);
George Wang, Counsel, Haynes & Boone LLP, Remarks at the Deal Lawyers Program on
Transaction Insurance as a M&A Strategic Tool (Oct. 7, 2015) [hereinafter Transaction
Insurance], http://www.aon.com/risk-services/asats/aon-insights/transaction-insurance.jsp
[https://perma.cc/V4Q9-EX82] (“On the tax indemnity side, you can think of this insurance as
an alternative to a private letter ruling from the IRS.”).
101. See Wood, supra note 100 (discussing tax opinions); Transaction Insurance, supra note
100 (discussing tax insurance).
102. See Wood, supra note 100 (discussing tax opinions); Transaction Insurance, supra note
100 (discussing tax insurance).
103. See SCHOENBERG, supra note 80, at 7 (explaining that tax insurance can be obtained
in as little as fifteen days); Wood, supra note 100 (“Rulings take time. An opinion can be
knocked out in days or weeks. A ruling takes weeks or months (usually you should assume
six months or more).”).
104. See Rev. Proc. 2019-3, 2019-1 I.R.B. 130 (listing domestic no-rule areas); Rev. Proc.
2019-7, 2019-1 I.R.B. 268 (listing international no-rule areas); see also Wolfe, supra note 79,
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PLRs has contributed to the increased use of both tax opinions and
third-party tax insurance.105 Given that both tax opinions and third-
party tax insurance are alternatives to PLRs for coping with tax
uncertainty, they are also alternatives to each other.106
There are several other similarities as well. Both tax opinions
and third-party tax insurance are bespoke (that is, tailored to a
given situation’s facts and analysis).107 In both, tax experts (either
the lawyer writing the opinion or experts hired by the insurance
company) carefully analyze the transaction to determine the likely
tax consequences and the likelihood that those tax consequences
will be achieved.108 When doing so, both rely on factual representa-
tions by the taxpayer, and misrepresentations will preclude a tax-
payer from recovering; similarly, both are subject to exclusions and
carve-outs (for example, for future changes in law), which limit the
potential financial exposure of the lawyer (for tax opinions) and the
insurer (for third-party tax insurance).109
There is also overlap between the types of transactions for which
tax opinions and third-party tax insurance are obtained. Both are
at 445-12 to -16 (providing examples where third-party tax insurance provides a useful alter-
native to a PLR); Wood, supra note 100 (suggesting the use of tax opinions when PLRs are not
available). 
105. See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 42, at 1049 (attributing the growth in tax opinions to
the growth of the IRS’s no-rule list); Amy S. Elliott, Greater Reliance on Tax Liability
Insurance Raises Questions, 149 TAX NOTES 477 (2015) (“As the IRS Office of Associate Chief
Counsel (Corporate) expands the scope of its no-rule policy to turn away more tax-free spinoff
transactions, taxpayers are increasingly relying on the [tax] insurance market to manage the
risks.”); Kenneth A. Gary, New Opportunity for Tax Lawyers: Insuring Tax Transactions, 104
TAX NOTES 26 (2004) (“[H]eavy interest in policies insuring tax results for specific transactions
in the wake of the IRS’s giving ‘no rule’ status to more issues.”).
106. STERBA, supra note 11, § 7.1 (discussing tax opinions, tax insurance, and PLRs as
alternatives to each other). 
107. See Woodward, supra note 11, at 21-23 (illustrating that the process for tax opinions
is tailored to the specific facts and circumstances of the situation); Transaction Insurance,
supra note 100 (“These [tax indemnity] policies are negotiated with the underwriter to fit the
specific needs of the parties and issues at hand.”).
108. See Circular 230 §§ 10.35, 10.37 (articulating requirements for rendering written
advice, including tax opinions); Gary, supra note 105 (describing insurance companies’ needs
for expert tax input on transactions in order to assess risk); Kahn, supra note 76, at 8 (de-
scribing the process for a client to receive third-party tax insurance); Woodward, supra note
11, at 22 (explaining that rendering a tax opinion requires expert analysis); De Berry, supra
note 81 (describing their process when issuing a tax insurance policy).
109. See 4 APPLEMAN, supra note 31, § 32.03[5][a], [b] (tax insurance); Wolfe, supra note
79, at 445-31 to -32 (tax insurance); Woodward, supra note 11, at 21-23 (tax opinions).
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used to increase tax certainty for mergers and acquisitions, REIT
and other favorable tax statuses, cross-border tax structuring, tax
credit transactions, et cetera.110 However, third-party tax insurers
generally do not insure any transaction that is a shelter, reportable
or listed transaction, or where the insured tax treatment is not more
likely than not to succeed.111 This approach precludes third-party
tax insurers from providing pure penalty protection insurance (in
other words, they will generally not insure the tax treatment of a
matter if there is only substantial authority or reasonable basis for
the position).112 Thus, at this point in the development of the third-
party tax insurance industry,113 insurers have been relatively con-
servative about which transactions they will insure.114 In contrast,
and although tax opinion practices vary by lawyer and firm, some
firms and some lawyers will write opinions for aggressive trans-
actions, including for reportable or listed transactions and for
matters on which the desired tax treatment is only supported by
substantial authority or reasonable basis.115 Thus, while there is
substantial overlap in the transactions for which a tax opinion or
tax insurance might be obtained, tax opinions are available more
broadly and can increase a taxpayer’s tax certainty in situations
where third-party tax insurance may be unavailable.
Whether a taxpayer has obtained a tax opinion or third-party tax
insurance, the taxpayer has some expectation of protection if the
tax position is not sustained,116 but the certainty and magnitude of
any such protection does differ. With tax insurance, the insured is
110. See supra notes 57-60, 80 and accompanying text.
111. See Transaction Insurance, supra note 100 (“[T]he sweet spot for the carriers, on any
tax issue, is about a ‘should’ level of comfort and above. But really, for anything that’s a ‘more
likely than not’ or above, it’s worth giving us a call to see if we can do something.”). An insurer
may also decline to insure a tax position even if reputable counsel gives a “more likely than
not” opinion, particularly if the matter is a shelter. 4 APPLEMAN, supra note 31, § 32.03[8];
supra note 81 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 66.
113. Insurers could become more aggressive as the market develops and becomes more
competitive. See Logue, supra note 76, at 400.
114. See Kahn, supra note 76, at 8; De Berry, supra note 81, at 2 (arguing that insurers are,
and are “rewarded” for being, conservative).
115. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
116. See infra Part IV.B (discussing that disappointed clients sue lawyers who rendered
bad tax opinions); supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing losses covered by tax
insurance).
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certain to recover if a loss is sustained, assuming that the insured
has otherwise abided by the terms of the insurance contract.117 In
contrast, with tax opinions, recovery is uncertain, even if a loss is
sustained, because recovery for a bad tax opinion depends on the
malpractice rules, pursuant to which a client typically only recovers
if the lawyer failed to meet the applicable standard of care.118
Similarly, the magnitude of the recovery from a lawyer who wrote
a tax opinion generally depends on proof of damages, and courts
vary as to how they define damages, meaning that, in some cases,
the client might only be able to recover a very small amount.119 In
contrast, the magnitude of recovery from a third-party insurer is
typically clearer, as it merely depends on the magnitude of the loss
sustained and the contract terms (for example, the contract’s cov-
erage cap).120 Thus, the amount of a potential recovery on account
of a tax opinion is less certain and may differ in magnitude as
compared to the potential recovery from an insurance policy, but the
former is technically uncapped, whereas the latter is generally
capped.
There are several other differences between tax opinions and
third-party tax insurance policies, including the fee, period for re-
covery, and the timing and degree of the lawyer/insurer’s involve-
ment in the matter. The fee for third-party tax insurance is typi-
cally calculated as a percentage of the coverage (with that percent-
age based partly on the risk involved),121 whereas the fee for a tax
opinion is typically calculated based on the billable hours spent by
the lawyers preparing the opinion, although sometimes lawyers
charge a flat fee.122 The period for recovery is specified in the third-
party tax insurance contract; the period for making claims is typi-
cally six years and is often selected based on the tax law’s applicable
statute of limitations.123 In contrast, the period for potential
117. See Wolfe, supra note 79, at 445-34 to -40.
118. See infra Part III.B.2.a.
119. See infra Part III.B.2.b.
120. See 4 APPLEMAN, supra note 31, § 32.03[2]-[3] (adding that there can still be disputes
about defined losses); Wolfe, supra note 79, at 445-25 to -30.
121. See Wolfe, supra note 79, at 445-24 to -25.
122. See infra notes 309-12 and accompanying text.
123. 4 APPLEMAN, supra note 31, § 32.03[7]; AON, MANAGING TAX RISK THROUGH TAX
INSURANCE (2016), http://www.aon.com/taxinsurance/attachments/US-Tax-brochure-Web-
version.pdf [https://perma.cc/46Q9-CUZS].
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recovery on account of a tax opinion depends on the jurisdiction’s
statute of limitations for malpractice actions.124 As to involvement
by the lawyer/insurer, the lawyer preparing a tax opinion is usually
heavily involved ex ante with structuring the transaction and
typically provides advice that may increase the likelihood that the
desired tax benefits will be sustained;125 however, the lawyer who
writes the tax opinion is not typically the same counsel that defends
the matter if the tax position is challenged by the government. In
contrast, the third-party tax insurer is typically not very involved in
the ex ante tax structuring; the insurer typically focuses on eval-
uating and pricing insurance for the transaction as it is presented
to them.126 The insurer has more involvement ex post if the tax
treatment is challenged. Specifically, the insurer often has the right
to be involved in the defense of the tax treatment, and although
insurers may not take control of the defense of the matter, they
generally retain the right to approve of important decisions in the
handling of the case, including whether to settle with the gov-
ernment.127
Although there are many similarities between tax opinions and
third-party tax insurance policies, the differences make clear that
they are not perfect substitutes for each other. This notion is con-
firmed by the fact that sometimes taxpayers obtain both tax opin-
ions and third-party tax insurance on the same matter.128 There
may be many reasons to do so, including that having a tax opinion
can expedite the underwriting process for the third-party tax insur-
ance.129 There are also many reasons a client might prefer third-
party tax insurance over a tax opinion or vice versa.130 For example,
124. See Jacob L. Todres, Investment in a Bad Tax Shelter: Malpractice Recovery from the
Tax Adviser Is No Slam Dunk, 107 TAX NOTES 217 (2005) (discussing the statute of limi-
tations in tax malpractice cases).
125. See Wood, supra note 100, at 836.
126. See 4 APPLEMAN, supra note 31, § 32.03[10]. 
127. See Wolfe, supra note 79, at 445-41 to -45; AON, supra note 123.
128. See, e.g., Robert Willens & Harley G.A. Wright, Tax-Free Real Estate Spinoffs: Will
They Catch On?, 94 TAX NOTES 619, 621 (2002) (discussing a transaction on which both a tax
opinion and tax liability insurance were obtained). 
129. See ROSEN & BLITZ, supra note 93, at 2.
130. See, e.g., SCHOENBERG, supra note 80, at 14 (giving an example of where third-party
tax insurance was helpful in part because “no tax opinion was available”); Davison, supra
note 87 (quoting insurance executives who suggested that a transaction that failed to close
because counsel could not render a tax opinion could have closed if tax insurance (rather than
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a taxpayer concerned with whether to take a reserve on its balance
sheet for an uncertain tax position in accordance with FIN 48 might
only need a tax opinion (so that the company can conclude that the
tax benefits are certain enough to book),131 but a taxpayer who is
more concerned with cash flow if the desired position is not
sustained would likely want third-party tax insurance.132
Ultimately, while there are some (sometimes significant) differ-
ences between the availability of, details of, and degree of protection
afforded by tax opinions and third-party tax insurance, both in-
crease comfort with respect to, and reduce the risks associated with,
uncertain tax positions. And both are used as substitutes for each
other and for PLRs. Understanding the similarities and differences
between tax opinions and third-party tax insurance provides insight
into the extent of their substitutability and helps to demonstrate
how tax lawyers, through their tax opinions, serve partly as tax
insurers.
III. INDICIA OF INSURANCE INHERENT IN TAX OPINIONS
Understanding the insurance-like aspect of tax opinions requires
going beyond drawing parallels to third-party tax insurance. It
requires an analysis of the extent to which tax opinions reflect
traditional indicia of insurance.
The precise definition of insurance subject to regulation varies
from state to state,133 but “[t]he essence of insurance is a transaction
where risk is transferred to another and then distributed across a
pool of similarly situated persons or properties.”134 Thus, “[t]hree
concepts are central to an insurance contract: risk; risk transfer-
ence; and risk distribution.”135 This Part examines the extent to
which tax opinions involve these three elements.
an opinion) was a condition to closing).
131. Cf. FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., supra note 65, at 3-4.
132. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (explaining that third-party tax insurance
generally ensures a recovery if a loss is sustained).
133. See 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 31, § 1.03[3][a].
134. Id. § 1.01[3]; see also STEVEN PLITT ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D § 1.6 (supp. 2018)
[hereinafter COUCH].
135. 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 31, § 1.03[1].
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As explained below, tax opinions reflect some indicia of insur-
ance but do not fit perfectly within the definition. However, because
this Article is not arguing that tax opinions ought to be regulated as
insurance under state law, the lack of a perfect fit is not problem-
atic. The fact that tax opinions ought not to be regulated as insur-
ance does not mean that there is not an insurance-like element
inherent in tax opinions. Thus, this Part uses the legal definition of
“insurance” as a tool to identify the extent to which the economic
relationship between tax opinion-givers and clients includes fea-
tures of insurance. That is, this analysis identifies tax opinions as
“insurance-like”—as one of a “number of other relationships” (aside
from things that are actually regulated as insurance) “that closely
resemble the insurance agreement and may, for some purposes, be
claimed to be the equivalent of insurance”136 even though they are
“so intimately entwined with [an]other field[ ] of law that [their]
insurance character is secondary.”137
A. Insurable Risk
Insurance requires an insurable risk, meaning that there must be
a “risk” and the insured must have an “insurable interest” in the
specific thing that is at risk.138
1. “Risk”
The concept of “risk” requires uncertainty or fortuity. “[T]he loss
must be one that is uncertain to occur or [that is] unpredictable and
outside the substantial control of the parties.”139 “[T]he loss must be
accidental in some sense,”140 and the contract must be aleatory in
that the insurer’s obligation “depend[s] upon some contingent
event”141 and that there is a possibility that “the insurer[ ] will never
have to perform.”142
136. COUCH, supra note 134, § 1.12.
137. Id. § 1.13.
138. 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 31, § 1.05[3]; see also COUCH, supra note 134, § 1.6.
139. 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 31, § 1.03[2]; see also id. § 1.05[2].
140. Id. § 1.05[2][a] (elaborating on the fortuity principle).
141. COUCH, supra note 134, § 1.10.
142. Id. § 1.10, n.10 (citing Root v. Am. Equity Specialty Ins., 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 631 (Cal. Ct.
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The tax treatment that is the subject of a tax opinion, while not
perfectly fortuitous, is uncertain, which is why a tax opinion is
obtained. Whether the tax treatment addressed in the opinion is
sustained depends on whether the client is audited, which issues are
raised upon audit, what arguments are made by the government
and the taxpayer in the contest, and how the government and/or the
court perceives those arguments.143 Of course, the tax lawyer can
make predictions about these issues and can help the client to
structure the transaction to reduce the risks, but the tax law and its
application to a particular set of facts are often uncertain.144 Thus,
whether the taxpayer’s desired tax treatment described in an opin-
ion is ultimately obtained is, at least to some degree, dependent on
chance.
Indeed, the existence of the third-party tax insurance market
supports this conclusion because third-party tax insurance and tax
opinions often cover the same type of risks.145 If these risks did not
reflect sufficient fortuity, there could be no tax insurance policies
covering them.146
2. “Insurable Interest”
In addition to the existence of “risk,” the insured must have an
“insurable interest” in the risk. Typically, insurance requires that
the insured has a “lawful and substantial economic interest in the
safety or preservation of property from loss, destruction or pecuni-
ary damage.”147 The insured’s economic interest in the “specific
App. 2005)).
143. Even when the taxpayer has a strong position, there can be an audit, with drawn-out,
expensive, and uncertain litigation. See Wood, supra note 100.
144. See generally Sarah B. Lawsky, Probably? Understanding Tax Law’s Uncertainty, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 1017 (2009) (discussing probability statements in tax as subjectivist, meaning
that they should be understood as reflecting the speaker’s belief about the likelihood
something will occur).
145. See supra notes 98-99, 110 and accompanying text.
146. See 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 31, § 1.05[2][a] (“The public policy underlying the fortuity
requirement is so strong that if the insurance policy itself does not expressly require that the
loss be accidental courts will imply such a requirement.”).
147. Id. § 1.05[3] (citation omitted).
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‘thing’” that could be “destroyed or injured”148 distinguishes insur-
ance from gambling.149
With a tax opinion, the taxpayer is taking a position that it is
entitled to favorable tax treatment, which yields an economic ben-
efit to the taxpayer.150 If that tax treatment is not sustained, then
that economic benefit would be reduced or completely eliminated,
and in some circumstances, the taxpayer could suffer further eco-
nomic loss in the form of penalties, contest costs, et cetera.151 Thus,
a taxpayer has an insurable risk in the particular tax treatment
that is the subject of a tax opinion. Again, this conclusion is sup-
ported by the existence of third-party tax insurance that insures
taxpayers for similar matters.
B. Transfer of Risk
Insurance also requires the “assumption of a risk of loss” and an
“undertaking to indemnify the insured against such loss.”152 In
typical insurance policies, the risk is transferred explicitly via a con-
tract providing that, in exchange for a fee, the insurer agrees to
indemnify the insured against the risk of loss.153
As discussed below, tax opinions involve the transfer of risk from
the client to the lawyer. However, the risk transference via tax
opinions is somewhat different than in traditional insurance
because (1) the risk transfer agreement is implicit, rather than
explicit; (2) the extent of the indemnity provided depends on the
application of the laws governing malpractice cases; and (3) the
transfer of risk is not the principle object and purpose of the tax
opinion. This Part will elaborate on these key aspects of the risk
transference achieved via tax opinions.
148. COUCH, supra note 134, § 1.6.
149. 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 31, § 1.05[3]. See generally Kendall J. Burr et al., Stranger-
Initiated Annuity Transactions and the Case for Insurable Interest, 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 113,
128-30 (2012) (discussing the “insurable interest” requirement as preventing wagering on
human lives).
150. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
152. COUCH, supra note 134, § 1.9.
153. Id. § 1.10; see also 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 31, §§ 1.05[4], 1.07.
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1. The Risk Transfer Is Implicit
The opinion-writer’s agreement to accept some of the client’s risk
of loss arises implicitly via the operation of the malpractice rules.
When the lawyer agrees to provide the client with a tax opinion, she
does so against the backdrop of default rules, including those
regarding malpractice, which govern the lawyer-client relation-
ship.154 These rules apply and become part of the terms of the
lawyer-client engagement unless the parties explicitly opt out. The
Model Rules of Professional Conduct155 restrict a lawyer’s ability to
enter into a contract with a client that limits the lawyer’s malprac-
tice liability, but such agreements are allowed if “the client is
independently represented in making the agreement.”156 As a result,
any lawyer who provides a tax opinion and who does not limit her
malpractice exposure in accordance with the ethical rules implicitly
agrees to indemnify the client for losses to the extent required by
154. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. Liability on the lawyer could also be
imposed via securities laws and other theories, but malpractice liability is the most common
and is thus the focus of this discussion.
155. The Model Rules are used in this Article as the applicable ethical standards governing
lawyers’ behavior because they have been adopted in some form in most states. 1 GEOFFREY
C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 1.15 B (4th ed. 2018). Each lawyer should,
of course, analyze her obligations under the version of the ethical rules that apply in her
jurisdiction. See generally AM. BAR ASS’N, JURISDICTIONAL RULES COMPARISON CHARTS (Oct.
30, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/policy/rule_charts/
#1 [https://perma.cc/6ACE-2EE9] (providing information about “how each jurisdiction has
modified (or, in the case of California, proposes to modify) each of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct”).
156. MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(h)(1) & cmt. 14 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017)
(restricting a lawyer’s ability to contractually limit her prospective liability for malpractice).
These rules vary state-to-state, so lawyers should check the applicable rules in the jurisdiction
in which they practice. See, e.g., CAL. RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT r. 3-400(a) (Sept. 14, 1992)
(not allowing lawyers to contractually limit malpractice liability); N.Y. RULES OF PROF ’L
CONDUCT § 1.8(h)(1) (Apr. 1, 2018) (same). See generally AM. BAR ASS’N CPR POLICY
IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE, VARIATIONS OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.
1.8: CONFLICT OF INTEREST: CURRENT CLIENTS: SPECIFIC RULES (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc_1_8.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GLZ4-6RP4] (identifying state-by-state deviations from Model Rule 1.8). Tax
accountants may have more flexibility to limit the applicability of the malpractice rules,
thereby making it easier for them to avoid accepting as much risk when rendering tax
opinions. See, e.g., Aaron v. Deloitte Tax LLP, 2016 WL 4430495 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016), aff’d
149 A.D.3d 580 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (enforcing a contract pursuant to which client
contractually agreed to shorten the time within which it could sue Deloitte for malpractice).
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the laws governing malpractice claims.157 Although this risk transfer
agreement is implicit rather than explicit as in typical insurance,
tax opinions do involve an agreement to indemnify.158
2. The Extent of the Risk Transferred Is Limited by
Requirements for Malpractice Recovery
The extent of the lawyer’s agreement to indemnify is, however,
limited by the laws governing malpractice recoveries. An unhappy
client who sues her tax lawyer for malpractice often does so on
either a tort (typically negligence) or contract theory.159 Suits on
other grounds are possible as well.160 Focusing on the most common
157. See infra Part V.B. (arguing that tax advisors who are concerned about the insurance-
like aspects of tax opinions might want to do more to prospectively limit their malpractice
liability).
158. Any risk transfer achieved by a tax opinion is via an indemnity obligation (that is,
where the lawyer may provide “compensation necessary to reimburse the [client’s] loss,” and
where the lawyer’s obligation to compensate for malpractice liability is owed directly to the
client and not to third parties such as the government). See 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 31,
§ 1.05[4]; COUCH, supra note 134, § 103.4. However, neither the laws governing malpractice
liability nor the tax law penalties imposed upon tax advisors cause the lawyer to assume the
client’s risk of loss; the lawyer, by issuing a tax opinion, does not become directly and person-
ally liable to the government for the taxes, interest, or penalties that the client owes. See
generally 1 RONALD E. MALLEN, LEGAL MALPRACTICE chs. 6-7 (2018) (discussing limited scope
of malpractice liability to nonclients); see also, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6694, 6700, 6701 (2012) (imposing
penalties on tax preparers, but not obligating the preparer to be liable for the client’s taxes
due); Circular 230 § 10.50(c) (allowing the imposition of monetary penalties on a tax
practitioner, but not providing that amounts paid by the lawyer would satisfy the client’s tax
obligations). This difference between indemnification and assumption may matter because
some definitions of insurance require more than an agreement to indemnify another for risk
of loss; they also require the actual “assumption of another’s risk.” COUCH, supra note 134,
§ 1.6 (citing Garcia v. City of Bridgeport, 51 A.3d 1089 (Conn. 2012)); see also In re Texas
Ass’n of Sch. Bds., 169 S.W.3d 653, 658-59 (Tex. 2005) (explaining that insurance involves
“assuming the risk ... in exchange for the premium payment” and not merely “promising to
compensate the insured for an actual ... loss”). Thus, the lack of an actual assumption of risk
may cause the opinion-writer/client relationship to fail to qualify as “insurance” under some
definitions. Nevertheless, it remains clear that tax opinions transfer some risk of loss from
client to lawyer, albeit via an indemnity and not an assumption. The presence of risk transfer
via an implicit indemnification agreement is sufficient to support this Article’s contention that
tax lawyers, by providing tax opinions, are serving an insurance-like function, even though
that function may not meet the definition of “insurance” for purposes of regulation.
159. See 1 MALLEN, supra note 158, § 8.28.
160. See STERBA, supra note 11, § 12.1 (listing other possible claims); see also Todres III,
supra note 70, at 709-10. Different claims may result in, for example, different statutes of
limitations, different damage measures, and differing abilities to recover for legal fees. See
2019] TAX LAWYERS AS TAX INSURANCE 2141
grounds for tax malpractice cases, a client alleging malpractice must
establish the following: “(1) a duty owed by the attorney to the plain-
tiff; (2) breach of that duty; (3) injuries suffered by the plaintiff; and
(4) a proximate cause between the injury suffered and the breach of
duty.”161
Taken together, these requirements for malpractice recovery
impose two key limitations on the extent of the risk transferred, and
thus on the indemnity implicitly agreed to, by a lawyer who renders
a tax opinion. First, the tax opinion-giver’s indemnification obliga-
tion is conditional, and it exists only if she has breached the
applicable standard of care.162 Second, the amount of that indemnifi-
cation obligation will be limited to the damages that arise from the
lawyer’s breach, as “damages” are understood in the malpractice
context.163 Thus, the risk that a lawyer accepts when providing a tax
opinion is both conditional and partial.
a. Indemnification Is Conditional on Breach of Standard of
Care
A tax opinion-writer’s indemnification obligation is conditional
because merely being wrong when providing legal advice generally
does not result in malpractice liability. For a disgruntled client to
recover under a negligence tort or contract theory, the lawyer must
have done more than make a “mere error in judgment”; she must
have failed to meet the applicable standard of care.164 The standards
of care for tort-based and contract-based malpractice actions are
“virtually identical” despite “emanating from different areas of the
law.”165 Specifically, a lawyer “must exercise reasonable competence
id. at 708-10.
161. Todres I, supra note 70, at 552 (citing BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., STANDARDS OF TAX
PRACTICE 312 (1997)).
162. See infra Part III.B.2.a.
163. See infra Part III.B.2.b.
164. Todres I, supra note 70, at 558; see also Woodward, supra note 11, at 7. See generally
2 MALLEN, supra note 158, § 17.27.
165. Todres II, supra note 70, at 1016.
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and diligence.”166 Failure to do so is a prerequisite for any recovery
in a negligence tort or contract malpractice action in court.167
The fact that any indemnity provided via a malpractice claim is
conditional on the lawyer’s (that is, the “insurer’s”) behavior is quite
different from typical insurance. With typical insurance, the
insurer’s obligation to indemnify is “conditional in a number of
aspects,” including the “need for a loss to fall within the contract’s
terms as to covered perils,” finality of the loss, and the insured’s
compliance with its obligations (for example, to provide truthful
representations and/or mitigate loss).168 Similar conditions apply to
recovery for tax malpractice. For example, an opinion-writer’s obli-
gation to indemnify a client for liability arising from an unsuccessful
tax position is contingent on the truthfulness of client’s representa-
tions on which the tax opinion reasonably relies,169 although the
opinion-writer generally cannot use the client’s representations to
escape liability if the opinion-writer knew the representations to be
false.170 However, an insurer’s obligation is generally not contingent
on behavior of the insurer itself; if there is a loss within the meaning
of the insurance contract and the loss is not subject to an exclusion
included in the contract, the insurer is generally obligated to in-
demnify the insured. In contrast, a lawyer is obligated to indemnify
a client for a bad tax opinion only if the lawyer failed to meet her
standard of care.171 Thus, the conditionality of the indemnity pro-
vided by a tax opinion giver is an important way in which tax
opinions differ from typical insurance.
Nevertheless, the liability imposed on a tax opinion writer may be
less conditional than a basic recitation of the malpractice standards
may suggest. This is for several reasons.
166. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 48-53 (AM.
LAW INST. 2000); 2 MALLEN, supra note 158, § 20.2 (“Determining the reasonableness of the
lawyer’s conduct requires consideration of the following criteria: (1) the requisite skill and
knowledge; (2) the degree of skill and knowledge to be possessed and exercised; (3) the effect
of local considerations and custom; and (4) any special abilities possessed by the lawyer.”).
167. See supra notes 159, 161 and accompanying text.
168. COUCH, supra note 134, § 1.10. 
169. Circular 230 § 10.37(a)(2)(iv) (requiring a tax opinion-writer’s reliance on represen-
tations be reasonable).
170. See, e.g., Kline v. First W. Gov’t Sec., Inc., 24 F.3d 480, 486-87 (3d Cir. 1994).
171. See Todres I, supra note 70, at 558.
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First, tax lawyers are subject to a heightened standard of care
because tax is a specialized area. In general, to meet the standard
of care, “an attorney should exercise the skill and knowledge
ordinarily possessed by attorneys under similar circumstances.”172
Where, as in tax law, the practice “requires special knowledge and
skills,” the practitioner will be held to the standard of care that
would ordinarily be exercised by a specialist.173 Thus, the standard
of care in tax matters is heightened,174 meaning that it may be eas-
ier to breach than in nonspecialty areas.
Moreover, the standard of care relevant in opinion matters, as
compared to less formal advice, may be especially high. Formal tax
opinions are typically sought from experts only on particularly im-
portant or difficult matters, and formal tax opinions have been
described as “the pinnacle of legal advice”175 and “one of the more
specialized tasks tax lawyers undertake.”176 As a result, commenta-
tors emphasize the importance of being particularly prudent when
rendering tax opinions177 and note that “[m]ost attorneys view for-
mal opinions as the type of work product that calls for the highest
standard of care.”178 Thus, the applicable standard of care in tax
opinion matters may be even higher than in tax matters that are
less pressing, less difficult, less formal, and less specialized and that
could be handled by a general tax attorney, rather than a specialist
in the particular tax issues critical to the tax opinion.179 Again, the
higher the standard of care, the easier it may be to breach, thereby
increasing the chance of an indemnity via a malpractice claim.
172. 2 MALLEN, supra note 158, § 20.2; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS, supra note 166, § 52(1).
173. 4 MALLEN, supra note 158, § 35.5; see also Horne v. Peckham, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1979) (holding that where expert assistance is needed, the practitioner will be held
to the standard expected of an expert); Todres I, supra note 70, at 553-59.
174. See STERBA, supra note 11, § 12.11; Todres I, supra note 70, at 553-54; Todres IV,
supra note 70, at 609.
175. Rothman, supra note 11, at 301.
176. Wood, supra note 67, at 1071.
177. See, e.g., Corneel, supra note 11, at 184; Wood, supra note 39, at 65; Woodward, supra
note 11, at 4 (describing rendering tax opinions as “a hazardous activity”).
178. Rothman, supra note 11, at 361.
179. See 4 MALLEN, supra note 158, § 35.5 (distinguishing between the degree of expertise
expected from those who practice tax in highly specialized areas); Michael B. Lang, Tax
Malpractice: Issues and Avoidance, 54 TAX MGMT. MEMO. (BNA) 19 (2013) (making similar
points).
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Second, tax lawyers are subject to an extra set of ethics guide-
lines—Circular 230180—that apply to lawyers (and others) who
“practice before the [IRS]”181 in addition to the general ethical rules
applicable to all lawyers in the lawyer’s jurisdiction. Circular 230
provides specific standards to which tax advisers must adhere both
in general and when providing written advice such as a tax
opinion.182
Both the broadly applicable legal ethics rules and the tax-specific
standards of practice may be relevant when establishing whether a
tax lawyer met the applicable standard of care. In general, the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide that a “[v]iolation of a
Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer
nor should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal
duty has been breached.... [The Model Rules] are not designed to be
a basis for civil liability.”183 However, the Model Rules also provide
that “since the Rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers,
a lawyer’s violation of a Rule may be evidence of breach of the
applicable standard of conduct.”184 Similarly, given that Circular
230 establishes standards of conduct by tax practitioners, a tax ad-
visor’s violation of Circular 230 may be evidence of breach of the
standard of conduct applicable to tax practitioners.185 Ultimately,
the existence of additional standards of practice in the tax context
(that is, beyond those that apply to all lawyers) means that the
relevant ethical standards impose more requirements on tax
180. Circular 230 § 10.
181. Id. §§ 10.0, 10.2(a)(4), 10.3 (applying Circular 230 to tax lawyers, CPAs, enrolled
agents, and more).
182. Id. § 10.37.
183. MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 20 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
184. Id. See generally 1 MALLEN, supra note 158, § 1.19; 2 id. § 15.12 (discussing the
relationship between malpractice and ethics rules); 1 HAZARD ET AL., supra note 155, § 5.01
(discussing the same).
185. Technically, Circular 230 does not explicitly address the relationship between the
standards of practice articulated therein and potential malpractice liability. However, the
principles articulated in the Model Rules about the relevance of the ethics rules to the
standard for civil liability should arguably apply not only to state bar ethics rules but also
Circular 230 rules that “parallel state bar ethics rules or are otherwise designed to protect
clients.” Lang, supra note 179; see also GALLER & LANG, supra note 44, at 293. Many of the
Circular 230 rules are designed to protect clients. See, e.g., Circular 230 §§ 10.35, 10.37
(setting standards for competence and for written advice). Thus, it is reasonable to use these
rules as guidance about the standard of care that tax advisors must meet as part of their duty
to clients. 
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practitioners than on other lawyers. Where there are more require-
ments with which a lawyer should comply, there may be more
opportunities to fail to do so. As a result, it may be easier for a client
to establish that the tax lawyer breached her standard of care.
Relatedly, the IRS Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR),
which is responsible for enforcing Circular 230,186 may operate to
assist a client pursuing a malpractice claim against a tax lawyer.
OPR exists in addition to the State Bar Associations that enforce the
ethics rules applicable to lawyers in the State.187 If a tax lawyer is
subject to an OPR investigation that results in an adverse determi-
nation, that could help the client establish the lawyer’s failure to
meet the applicable standard of care.188 This could be helpful for an
aggrieved client in the same way as if the Department of Justice
(DOJ) or State Bar Association reached an agreement with a lawyer
in which the lawyer admitted misconduct; such an admission
“helps establish the taxpayer’s case for adviser malfeasance.”189
Admittedly, OPR’s disciplinary actions typically involve matters
unrelated to tax opinions,190 but it is at least possible that OPR
could become involved in a matter involving an opinion-writer. And
the existence of a body tasked with enforcing the tax-specific stan-
dards of practice means that tax clients may have another ally (that
is, beyond those agencies that focus on compliance of all lawyers
with the generally applicable ethical rules)—OPR—if they are
claiming, in a malpractice action, that a tax lawyer failed to meet
her professional responsibilities.
186. OPR: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ’s), IRS, https://www.irs.gov/tax-professionals/
frequently-asked-questions [https://perma.cc/5J3J-G7JQ].
187. See, e.g., Conduct & Discipline, ST. B. CAL., http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Attorneys/
Conduct-Discipline [https://perma.cc/Y6E6-CNA9] (explaining the California State Bar’s
“central role in the development and enforcement of laws that govern attorney conduct”).
188. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
189. Johnson, supra note 11, at 956. But see Soled, supra note 30, at 294 (noting that state
disciplinary boards may not be particularly effective in “reprimand[ing] rogue practitioners
for orchestrating abusive tax shelters”).
190. OPR frequently addresses a tax advisor’s prior (tax or nontax) court convictions and
various other types of advisor fraud or malfeasance (such as theft of client funds, threats
against an IRS agent, and multiple failures to file or respond to inquiries). See OPR: Fre-
quently Asked Questions (FAQ’s), supra note 186; see also IRS, IRS TAX FORUM 2017, OPR
DISCIPLINE WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW 14-23 (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2017ntf-
oprdDiscipline.pdf [https://perma.cc/PX2T-V6Y2].
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Third, the varying levels of confidence at which tax opinions are
rendered191 pose additional malpractice risks.192 For example, the
levels of confidence provide more opportunities for a lawyer to over-
state, perhaps dramatically, the confidence warranted for the tax
position.193 When arguing about the breach of a standard of care, the
higher the confidence level in the opinion, the more opportunity that
the client has to argue that a competent practitioner would not have
rendered an opinion at such a high level.194 This could increase the
likelihood that the tax lawyer breached her standard of care, lead-
ing to an increased likelihood of malpractice recovery.
The risk of malpractice recovery for an over-confident tax opinion
is exacerbated if the opinion is an important part of completing the
transaction and the tax lawyer receives a larger than normal fee in
the transaction.195 Caselaw suggests that such situations create an
inherent conflict of interest for the lawyer because “[t]he lawyer
then has a strong incentive to provide the opinion necessary to
assure that the transaction will proceed, regardless of what an ob-
jective analysis of the transaction would conclude.”196 This incentive
could cause the “trier of fact in a malpractice action, observing this
conflict, [to] be more inclined to find the opinion itself negligent, if
not intentionally misleading.”197
In addition, the varying opinion levels present greater risk that
a lawyer could fail to meet her duty to communicate effectively with
a client, which could also trigger malpractice liability. An important
191. See supra Part I.A.2. Outside of tax, legal opinions generally do not use these levels
of confidence; nontax legal opinions are generally binary.
192. The varying levels of confidence at which tax opinions are rendered could also cut the
other way and reduce malpractice risk. For example, a “more likely than not” opinion provides
relatively weak assurance about the likelihood of success of a tax position, so if the position
is ultimately not sustained, it may be hard to establish that liability should be imposed. See
Todres IV, supra note 70, at 653.
193. See Corneel, supra note 11, at 184.
194. See id.; Lang, supra note 179; Todres IV, supra note 70, at 610-11, 652-53.
195. Lang, supra note 179.
196. Id. (citing Canal Corp. v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 199 (2010) (involving the issuance of an
opinion in exchange for a large fixed fee, contingent on the closing of the transaction)).
197. Id.; see also 1 HAZARD ET AL., supra note 155, § 5.03.2 (conflict of interest can lead to
an inference of breach of the applicable standard of care); Michael B. Lang, Conflicts about
Conflicts: Implications of the Tax Court Canal Corp Decision for Disciplinary and Malpractice
Actions, 53 TAX MGMT. MEMORANDUM (BNA) 3, 14 n.102 (2012).
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part of discharging one’s duty to a client in matters where the law
is unsettled is 
advis[ing] [the client] of the unsettled status of the law and
giv[ing the client] the opportunity to knowingly assess the risks
and knowingly elect from among available courses of conduct.
Fail[ing] to inform the client would give rise to malpractice
liability, despite the fact that the advice actually given was
otherwise justifiable under the mere error in judgment rule.198
In the tax opinion context, for example,
[t]erms such as “reasonable basis” and “substantial authority”
[which are important thresholds for avoiding penalties if a posi-
tion is not sustained] need to be carefully explained to the client
unless the lawyer has reason to know that the client under-
stands the terminology.... [E]ven if the terminology used is a
usage of the trade, such as in a so-called “should” opinion or
“will” opinion ... the level of confidence should be fully explained
to the client.199
If a lawyer fails to adequately explain to her client the import of the
confidence level at which the opinion is rendered, she risks breach-
ing her duties to her client and thereby opening herself up to mal-
practice liability.200
Fourth, although a breach of the standard of care is required to
succeed in court on a malpractice claim, it is not clear how this
standard of care is applied in practice because the few published
cases generally focus on procedural, rather than substantive, tax
malpractice issues.201 Further, many tax opinion malpractice cases
go to binding arbitration or settle privately, rather than being
resolved with finality in court.202 The use of confidential arbitration
to resolve disputes between taxpayers and their tax advisers means
198. Todres I, supra note 70, at 559 (footnote omitted) (citing caselaw).
199. Lang, supra note 179.
200. See Circular 230 § 10.33(a)(3); MODEL RULE PROF ’L CONDUCT r. 1.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N
2017).
201. Todres IV, supra note 70, at 605-06.
202. See Lang, supra note 179 (“[I]t is difficult to get a handle on how large areas of
malpractice law apply or should apply to tax practitioners.”); Soled, supra note 30, at 274-75.
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that the applicable standard of care is relitigated in secret in each
matter. Lack of public disclosure about how the standard of care is
applied in these cases makes it difficult to get insight into what tax
malpractice really entails and how often (and how much) liability is
imposed on tax advisors.203 In addition, the secrecy in which the
standard of care is litigated in tax malpractice cases could lead to
material variability from matter to matter as to what a breach of
the standard of care entails, meaning that it could be easier to
establish a breach of the standard of care in some cases than in
others. Further, some tax opinion malpractice matters may involve
payouts when the breach is unclear because the tax opinion giver
(and likely, her malpractice insurer) may agree to settle merely to
end the matter and avoid expensive litigation.204 Thus, unhappy cli-
ents who sue for tax malpractice may receive some indemnification
even where there are questions about whether the lawyer breached
the applicable standard of care. As a result, the indemnity provided
via malpractice may be less conditional than it appears at first.
* * * 
In sum, although the indemnity provided by malpractice liability
is conditional on the lawyer’s breach of the standard of care, there
is at least some risk transfer occurring when a lawyer renders a tax
opinion, and there are reasons to believe that the risk transfer may
be less conditional in the tax opinion context than in other contexts.
203. See Kip Dellinger, End Tax Opinion Reliance? Never!, 142 TAX NOTES 217 (2014)
(“[M]any [tax malpractice] disputes were subject to confidential, binding arbitration, [so] it’s
impossible to know their costs.”).
204. Clients who received tax opinions on matters that are successfully challenged by the
tax authorities are inclined to sue. See Soled, supra note 30, at 287-88; Todres IV, supra note
70, at 606. Defending tax opinion malpractice cases can entail “huge cost[s].” Dellinger, supra
note 203. Thus, it is reasonable to infer that some matters settle, even in the absence of clear
liability, if the settlement costs are less than the expected costs of litigation. See RICHMOND
ET AL., supra note 70, at 10 (noting, when discussing litigation malpractice, that some matters
settle for nuisance value); Lorelei Laird, ABA Study Suggests Legal Malpractice Insurers Are
Settling Sooner, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 17, 2016, 11:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
aba_study_suggests_legal_malpractice_insurers_are_settling_sooner [https://perma.cc/86US-
WSSW] (“[T]he cost of litigation has increased, which is causing insurers to offer settlements
earlier.”). Of course, a lawyer or firm may continue to defend against a malpractice claim even
if the insurer wants to settle, but insurer preferences about settlement may affect the dis-
position of at least some malpractice matters. 
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b. Indemnification Is Limited in Amount to “Damages”
The indemnity implicitly agreed to by a lawyer who renders a tax
opinion is limited in another way—by the definition of “damages”
that are recoverable in malpractice cases.
Generally, in an insurance contract, the insured “is entitled to
compensation for such loss as has been occasioned by the perils
insured against, the right to recover being commensurate with (1)
the loss sustained, or (2) the amount contractually specified.”205
With third-party tax insurance, the covered loss, although often sub-
ject to coverage caps and deductibles, usually includes taxes owed
if an insured tax position is not sustained, interest on such taxes,
penalties, contest expenses, and a gross-up.206
Damages recoverable pursuant to a malpractice claim may not
cover all such costs. Penalties207 and corrective costs (including costs
to contest the tax treatment, but not the costs of the malpractice
claim)208 are typically recoverable in malpractice actions. However,
as explained in the remainder of this Part, malpractice recovery for
taxes owed, interest, and gross-ups may be limited. Thus, the mag-
nitude of the risk transferred to the tax lawyer pursuant to a tax
opinion may be less than the risk transferred to an insurance
company pursuant to a third-party tax insurance policy.
As to the malpractice recovery for taxes owed, “[t]he general rule
... seems well settled that recovery is available for additional taxes
that were avoidable but for the [lawyer’s breach of the standard of
care] but not for other, unavoidable taxes.”209 That is, the client is
generally entitled to recover for the taxes paid, but only to the
extent that those taxes exceed the taxes the client would have paid
had the client received competent advice.210 Thus, if no taxes would
205. COUCH, supra note 134, § 1.10.
206. See Wolfe, supra note 79, at 445-25 to -30.
207. See Todres III, supra note 70, at 731-32.
208. See id. at 733-36, 750-52.
209. Todres III, supra note 70, at 712.
210. See, e.g., Thomas v. Cleary, 768 P.2d 1090, 1091-92 n.5 (Alaska 1989); O’Bryan v.
Ashland, 717 N.W.2d 632, 633-33, 638 (S.D. 2006). The entire tax loss, including the
unavoidable portion, may be recoverable in limited cases, if for example, the tax adviser
perpetrated fraud rather than merely behaved negligently. See JOSEPH ERWIN, 619 T.M.: TAX
OPINIONS AND OTHER TAX ADVICE—PREPARATION, USE AND RELIANCE § VII.C.2 (2018) (citing
Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, 559 N.Y.S.2d 312 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990)); see also
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have been due had the client been competently advised, the entire
amount of taxes paid by the client could be recoverable. On the
other hand, if there was no opportunity to avoid the unfavorable tax
result, then the taxes borne by the client are not proximately caused
by the lawyer’s behavior; rather the taxes were unavoidable and are
generally not recoverable at all in a malpractice action. In addition,
although the standard for calculating “additional taxes” is easily
stated, courts have been inconsistent in the application of this stan-
dard, meaning that “[d]amages that should be recoverable as a
result of the payment of additional tax liabilities caused by a
practitioner’s malpractice have not been awarded in a variety of
situations.”211 Notwithstanding these inconsistencies and the
“possibility that the trier of fact will not understand the proof of
causation and damages,”212 commentators caution that “tax lawyers
and other tax practitioners should [still] anticipate that awards for
damages resulting from malpractice will include back taxes payable
because of the malpractice.”213 Even if a court carefully applies the
“additional taxes” definition for purposes of calculating tax malprac-
tice damages, this definition means that the indemnity for “addi-
tional taxes” provided via a tax opinion will often cover less than an
indemnity provided by a third-party tax insurance policy, which
would typically cover all taxes due (subject to coverage limits and
retentions).
As to interest, there is considerable variability in different states’
approaches to whether interest paid on tax underpayments is
recoverable in malpractice actions. The three divergent views are
summarized as follows:
According to the view that is probably the majority view, such
interest is recoverable from a defendant just like any other
damages proximately caused. A second view, diametrically op-
posite and likely the minority view, absolutely prohibits the re-
covery of such interest. A third view, a middle view followed in
several states, permits the recovery of such interest, but only to
Hosfelt v. Miller, No. 97-JE-50, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5506, at *14 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 22,
2000).
211. Lang, supra note 179, at 6.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 7.
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the extent it exceeds the interest actually earned by the plaintiff
on the underpaid taxes.214
Thus, whether a client will be able to obtain a malpractice recovery
for interest on underpaid taxes depends on the court’s approach.215
In some courts, the recovery for interest pursuant to a malpractice
claim could be equivalent to the recovery for interest in a full-
coverage insurance policy—that is, fully recoverable. But in other
courts, the malpractice recovery for interest could be considerably
less.
As to gross-ups, the few cases considering this issue have split.216
The leading author of articles about tax malpractice argues, how-
ever, that “if the goal of the law is to put the injured party as close
as possible to where he or she would have been with non-negligent
tax advice, then ... the damage award should be grossed-up [if the
award is taxable].”217 Nevertheless, it remains uncertain whether a
malpractice recovery for a bad tax opinion would include a gross-up.
In contrast, third-party tax insurance policies often do.218
An additional complexity in the determination of damages (and
thus, in determining the magnitude of the indemnity provided by a
tax opinion) arises because of the different confidence levels at
which an opinion can be rendered.219 Two examples help illustrate
this concept.
First, consider a “substantial authority” level opinion, which
reflects less than a 50 percent chance of success on the merits
(typically 35-40 percent).220 If a tax position has “substantial au-
thority,” a taxpayer in a non-shelter matter is generally able to
avoid an accuracy-related penalty for a substantial understatement
214. Todres III, supra note 70, at 723-24 (citations omitted).
215. See id.
216. Compare Pytka v. Gadsby Hannah, LLP, No. 01-1546 BLS, 2002 Mass. Super. LEXIS
461, at *25 n.1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 2002) (holding no gross-up recovery), with Oddi v.
Ayco Corp., 947 F.2d 257, 267-68 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that gross-up is recoverable).
217. Todres III, supra note 70, at 767. The taxability of the malpractice damage award is
outside the scope of this Article. See generally Robert W. Wood, Tax Treatment of Legal
Malpractice Recoveries, 114 TAX NOTES 665 (2007).
218. See AON, supra note 123.
219. See Todres IV, supra note 70, at 653.
220. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2); see also Rothman, supra note 11, at 319-21.
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without disclosing the position.221 If the tax position described in the
opinion is not sustained, there should be no recovery for “additional
taxes” at all because the opinion itself states that the lawyer ren-
dering the opinion believes that the tax position was not likely to be
sustained. Thus, the taxes due were likely unavoidable, and not
caused by the tax lawyer’s negligence. Penalties may be recoverable
if the penalties are imposed because of the lawyer’s breach of the
standard of care and would not have been imposed had competent
advice been provided.222 But there is almost no chance that the tax
itself would be recoverable in a typical malpractice action.
Second, consider the damages recoverable on account of a “pie-in-
the-sky” tax opinion that dramatically overstated the likelihood of
success (for example, opining at a “will” level of confidence when
competent counsel would have only opined at a “substantial author-
ity” level).223 “Additional taxes” that are recoverable in a malpractice
action are generally not determined based on the extent to which
the actual tax result differed from what the tax adviser promised
(meaning that, malpractice actions generally do not award “expecta-
tion damages”).224 Thus, there would not be more “additional taxes”
owed by a lawyer who rendered a “will” level opinion than a “more
likely than not” level opinion on a matter if there was no way to
structure the transaction to avoid taxes. The “additional taxes” in
these circumstances would be the same (zero), but at higher opinion
levels, it may be easier to establish that the opining lawyer
breached the applicable standard of care (for example, that “the
opinion has ... vastly overstated the likelihood for success”), thereby
triggering liability for damages.225
The foregoing makes it clear that the magnitude of an indemnity
implicitly provided by a lawyer who renders a tax opinion may not
cover all of the losses typically covered by third-party tax insurance.
However, the fact that coverage is less than full does not mean that
the arrangement is not insurance-like. Many insurance policies
221. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B) (2017).
222. See Todres III, supra note 70, at 712, 731-33.
223. See id. at 719-22.
224. See id. (discussing the damages that courts award in “cases involving ‘pie-in-the-sky’
promises by tax professionals” and arguing that “a more appropriate measure of damages
would have been the difference between the promised and the actual tax results”).
225. Todres IV, supra note 70, at 653; see supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
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provide less than full coverage for losses; policies regularly limit the
coverage by imposing coverage caps and/or retentions/deductibles
and by limiting the types of losses that are covered.226 Similarly, a
third-party insurance policy may limit the indemnity to a maximum
of some fixed percentage of any covered loss.227 With the indemnity
provided by a tax opinion, such limits are imposed not explicitly by
contract, but rather implicitly by the laws applicable to malpractice
recoveries. Again, these laws are part of the backdrop against which
lawyers and clients enter into engagements and become part of the
terms of the engagement. Thus, the coverage limitations imposed by
the rules about malpractice “damages” could be understood as inher-
ent in the terms of the indemnity agreement to which the parties
implicitly agreed.228 Ultimately, limitations on the extent of the
damage coverage via a possible malpractice recovery does not mean
that there is no transfer of risk. It merely means that a subset of the
risk is transferred, and that is still consistent with an insurance-like
indemnity arrangement.
3. Risk Transfer Is Not the “Principle Object and Purpose”
The foregoing demonstrates that there is some risk transfer to a
lawyer who renders a tax opinion, even though the indemnity pro-
vided may be conditional and limited in amount. Not all agreements
to indemnify, however, constitute “insurance” within the meaning
of state insurance statutes.229 An indemnification agreement will
generally only constitute “insurance” for purposes of regulation if
the “principle object and purpose” of the arrangement is the transfer
of risk.230 “The risk transfer [must be] the point of the contract; it is
226. See 4 APPLEMAN, supra note 31, § 32.03[2]-[3], [10]; Wolfe, supra note 79, at 445-25
to 445-30.
227. See 4 APPLEMAN, supra note 31, § 32.03[1] (providing an example where the parties
insured for 60 percent of the potential loss).
228. See infra Part III.B.1.
229. 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 31, § 1.03[1]; COUCH, supra note 134, §§ 1.7-1.8.
230. Jordan v. Grp. Health Ass’n, 107 F.2d 239, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (“The question [of
whether a state insurance statute applies to regulate an arrangement] turns, not on whether
risk is involved or assumed, but on whether that or something else to which it is related in
the particular plan is its principal object and purpose.”); see also supra note 158 (discussing
that tax lawyers do not actually assume a client’s risk of loss).
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as if risk is the commodity being transferred, much like another
contract would transfer real estate or personal property.”231
This requirement is not met by indemnities provided via tax
opinions because the primary objective of a tax opinion is not the
transfer of risk. Rather, an opinion is intended to “express[ ] ...
professional judgment on the legal issues explicitly addressed,”232
and the primary objective of any tax opinion is to provide “some
level ... of comfort or assurance regarding the tax treatment or
consequences relating to a particular transaction or series of trans-
actions.”233 Various concerns motivate clients to seek tax opinions,
but clients generally do not ask for opinions solely or primarily to
put the lawyer “on the hook” for the potential losses if the desired
tax treatment is not sustained, nor would tax lawyers likely be
willing to render an opinion solely or even primarily for that
purpose.234
The conclusion that the risk transfer inherent in a tax opinion is
not the principle object and purpose of a tax opinion—and thus
should not be regulated as insurance—is supported by the analysis
in a case about H&R Block’s “[p]eace of [m]ind program.”235 The
“[p]eace of [m]ind program” was “an enhanced version” of H&R
Block’s “basic guarantee of the accuracy of its tax-preparation
services,” pursuant to which, “in the event Block ma[de] an error
which results in the customer’s tax liability being initially under-
estimated, Block [would] pay up to $5,000 of the customer’s newly
revealed tax liability.”236 In concluding that the company was not
subject to a penalty for selling insurance without a license, the court
held that the “[p]eace of [m]ind program” was not a contract for
“insurance” because, among other reasons, the indemnity was
“inextricably linked to those [tax preparation] services [provided by
231. 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 31, § 1.03[2]; see also COUCH, supra note 134, § 1.8 (indicating
that the risk transfer must be “the contract’s dominant purpose”).
232. Comm. on Legal Ops., supra note 11, at 171 (discussing opinions in general);
Woodward, supra note 11, at 5 (noting that tax lawyers likely believe that this description
applies to tax opinions as well as third-party legal opinions).
233. Woodward, supra note 11, at 13.
234. STERBA, supra note 11, § 1.3.
235. See H&R Block E. Tax Servs., Inc. v. Dep’t of Commerce & Indus., Div. of Ins., 267
S.W.3d 848, 849 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008).
236. Id.
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Block],”237 meaning that the tax preparation service (and not the
indemnity) was the primary purpose of the contract.238 The indem-
nity provided via a tax opinion is similarly inextricably linked to the
provision of the advice contained in the tax opinion. Indeed, the
indemnity provided via a tax opinion is even less like “insurance”
subject to state regulation than H&R Block’s indemnity because: (a)
the agreement to indemnify pursuant to a tax opinion is implicit,
whereas the H&R Block “peace of mind” program was an explicit
agreement;239 (b) the agreement to indemnify pursuant to a tax
opinion is not triggered if the opinion is merely wrong—there must
be a breach of the applicable standard of care—whereas the H&R
Block indemnity was triggered upon mere error;240 and (c) the “addi-
tional taxes” owed by the taxpayer may or may not be covered under
the implicit indemnity effectuated by the malpractice rules, whereas
up to $5,000 of the taxpayer’s additional taxes are definitely covered
by the H&R Block “peace of mind program.”241
Ultimately, the transfer of risk is not the primary object and
purpose of a tax opinion and is, instead, inextricably linked to the
provision of tax advising services. Thus, it is clear that tax opinions
should not be regulated as insurance, even though tax opinions
involve a key element of insurance (specifically, indemnification)
and may even be described as the “equivalent of insurance” for some
purposes.242
C. Distribution of Risk
Although the prior Part concluded that tax opinions should not be
regulated as insurance, it is still useful to complete the three-
pronged “insurance” analysis by examining the third prong—wheth-
er tax opinions involve the “distribut[ion of risk] across a group of
similarly situated persons, each of whose risk has been assumed in
a similar transaction.”243
237. Id. at 863.
238. Id. at 863-66.
239. Compare infra Part III.B.1., with H&R Block E. Tax Servs., 267 S.W.3d at 849.
240. Compare infra Part III.B.2.a., with H&R Block E. Tax Servs., 267 S.W.3d at 849.
241. Compare infra Part III.B.2.b., with H&R Block E. Tax Servs., 267 S.W.3d at 849.
242. COUCH, supra note 134, §§ 1.12-1.13.
243. 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 31, § 1.03[2].
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Lawyers who write tax opinions regularly engage in some degree
of distribution of risk. They typically provide multiple opinions for
multiple clients, thereby accepting a variety of risks for a variety of
clients, although often on the same issue.244 Some clients might get
audited, and some tax positions might not be sustained. Thus, by
accepting fees in these various situations, only some of which (or
hopefully, none or very few of which) are likely to result in indem-
nity payments, the clients’ risks that are transferred to the lawyers
are distributed across a broader pool of similarly situated persons.
However, with typical insurance, the distribution of risk via pool-
ing typically “employs the law of large numbers. As you average
together more numbers in a certain range, the average becomes
more stable and predictable.... By pooling insureds, the average cost
and risks become more stable.”245 Effective pooling and risk dis-
tribution generally require very large numbers, as with auto
insurance, health insurance, and life insurance.246 Even a large law
firm that provides tax advice and opinions regularly may not advise
on enough matters to be able to pool risks so as to leverage the law
of large numbers and make the law firm’s exposure to such risks
stable and predictable.247 In this way, the risk pooling done by a law
firm differs from that by an insurance company. Of course, third-
party tax insurers also insure only tax matters, and an insurance
company may only have a small pool of tax policies, in part because
tax insurance is still a relatively young industry.248 However, the
companies that provide tax insurance also typically provide a
variety of other types of insurance, and thus are able to pool tax
risks with various other risks.249 Then again, large law firms that
have malpractice risk in nontax departments (such as in securities
or litigation) may be similarly pooling tax risks with other risks.
244. See generally supra Part I.A.
245. 1 SHERILYN PASTOR, NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE: COVERAGE
ANALYSIS AND PRELITIGATION PROCEDURES § 1.05 (2017) (emphasis omitted).
246. Cf. id.
247. Cf. id.
248. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
249. See, e.g., Insurance for Business and Enterprises, AIG (2019), https://www.aig.com/
business/insurance [https://perma.cc/4Q8B-5TGK] (listing some of the “broad range of
products and services” they provide, including not only tax liability and other mergers and
acquisitions-related insurance, but also casualty insurance, cyber insurance, health insurance,
professional liability insurance, property insurance, and more).
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In addition, “[f]or risk pooling to work, the risks pooled must be
independent.”250 However, the risks transferred through tax opin-
ions rendered by a particular law firm may not be particularly di-
versified. This is because the lawyers of the law firm may be giving
similar advice on similar transactions. Lawyers often become
experts in narrow areas of law and then attract clients needing
exactly that particular type of advice. On the other hand, the clients
may have different business goals and risk preferences, so lawyers
may adjust their approach to an issue based on the particular client.
And clients may have different likelihoods of being audited and, if
audited, the clients and lawyers may encounter different govern-
ment employees who may handle the matters differently. In these
and other ways, the risks accepted by a law firm that writes many
opinions may be somewhat diversified, but to the extent that the
relevant substantive issues (and advice with respect to such issues)
are similar across clients, that would reduce diversification and the
efficacy of the risk pooling that a firm is able to achieve.251
The “distribution of risk” concept may also require an insurance
company to assemble capital (whether from premiums or otherwise)
to ensure that the company has a minimum amount of resources
available to pay claims.252 Law firms typically do not aggregate
client fees in this way, but law firms often do have malpractice
insurance.253 If a firm has sufficient malpractice insurance (which
it may not), the malpractice insurance is effectively reinsurance
250. 1 PASTOR, supra note 245, § 1.05.
251. It is also possible that the law firm does not want to pool and diversify risk. Instead,
the firm may want to make a directional bet on the success of a particular tax position that
the firm helps multiple clients take.
252. See generally Kris DeFrain, U.S. Insurance Financial Regulatory Oversight and the
Role of Capital Requirements, CTR. INS. POL’Y & RES. NEWSL., (Jan. 2012), https://www.naic.
org/cipr_newsletter_archive/vol2_oversight.htm [https://perma.cc/4YPX-SX6Z] (discussing
risk-based capital requirements for insurance companies).
253. See Woodward, supra note 11, at 12 (suggesting, in an article on tax opinions, that
“malpractice insurance is an imperative for all practitioners”). However, some lawyers (more
commonly in small and solo practices) forego liability insurance entirely, and other lawyers
are underinsured. See Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Liability Insurer Data as a Window on
Lawyers’ Professional Liability, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1273, 1277-87 (2015) (describing data
about the levels of professional liability insurance that different lawyers and firms obtain).
Underinsured lawyers may not be able to use malpractice insurance as a reinsurance strategy
to distribute risk effectively.
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through which the firm ensures that it would have sufficient funds
to pay indemnity claims if any arise.254
Ultimately, the distribution of risk in the tax opinion context may
or may not be enough for indemnities via tax opinions to constitute
insurance. However, law firms that regularly write tax opinions
engage in the distribution of risk, at least to a limited degree.
Concerns about the efficacy of the risk pooling and risk distribution
may raise questions about whether law firms should be acting as
insurers, but that is a normative (rather than descriptive) question,
and therefore is outside the scope of this article.
D. Conclusion About the Applicability of the Insurance 
Construct to Tax Opinions
The foregoing demonstrates that the insurance framework is not
a perfect fit for describing the loss protection provided via a tax
opinion. The traditional indicia of insurance are present, at least to
some degree, when a lawyer provides a tax opinion: the client’s
desired tax treatment is an insurable risk; the lawyer does agree
(albeit implicitly and conditionally) to indemnify the client for some
of the client’s risk of loss if the desired tax treatment is not sus-
tained; and the lawyer may distribute the transferred risk—at least
minimally—across multiple clients and matters on which the lawyer
advises. The implied indemnification agreement inherent in a tax
opinion is, however, unlikely to meet traditional definitions of in-
surance for several reasons, including because the primary objective
of the tax opinion is not the transfer of risk. Thus, tax opinions are
not sufficiently like insurance to merit regulating them as insur-
ance.
Nevertheless, an important element of insurance—an agreement
to indemnify for some risk of loss—is inherent in the relationship
between the client and the tax-opinion-writing lawyer. And such
indemnification obligations, in the form of malpractice recoveries,
may be more likely among tax opinions for several reasons, as
detailed above.255
254. See 7 APPLEMAN, supra note 31, § 71.02[1],[3] (defining reinsurance and its purpose).
255. See supra Part III.B.2.
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Despite tax opinions’ role in shifting, to the opinion-writing
lawyer, some of the client’s risk that the client’s tax position will be
successfully challenged, it is important to acknowledge that tax
opinions shift only some of the client’s risk to the lawyer. A tax
opinion also offloads some of the client’s risk to the government,
and a tax opinion ensures that client retains some of its own risk.
A tax opinion can shift some portion of the risk of an unsuccessful
tax position away from the taxpayer and over to the government be-
cause tax opinions can, at least in some circumstances, help create
a penalty-free zone for taxpayers, even if the taxpayer’s position is
incorrect.256 In this zone, the government bears risks and costs (such
as, enforcement costs or foregone revenue) all without the oppor-
tunity to recover penalties that the taxpayer would otherwise owe.257
Moreover, this dynamic—in which getting a tax opinion increases
the chance that a client who takes an aggressive position will only
have to pay back taxes and interest (and not penalties) if the
position is successfully challenged—can encourage taxpayers to take
aggressive positions more frequently, thereby exacerbating the use
of tax opinions to shift risk from the taxpayers to the government.
Even if the client’s tax position, taken in reliance on a tax opinion,
is successfully challenged and interest and penalties are imposed,
clients often bear the economic burden of these losses and cannot
shift the losses to their tax advisor. The client’s ability to recover
from the tax advisor is limited for several reasons, including the fact
that recovery is generally contingent on the advisor’s breach of the
standard of care.258 In addition, the opinions themselves are de-
signed to ensure that some of the client’s risk remains with the cli-
ent. Specifically, the assumptions, caveats, and client represen-
tations on which opinions rely significantly limit the extent of the
256. See Wood, supra note 67, at 1071, 1073; see also Johnson, supra note 11, at 960
(explaining that “[c]lient[s] get[ ] [v]alue [o]ut of [w]rong [o]pinions”).
257. Even where penalties may be available, the government bears the risk of nondetection
and the risk of an unsuccessful challenge. Where penalties are available, however, they serve
as a mechanism for reducing, on net, the costs borne by the government. Note that the
government can bear some costs of aggressive taxpayer positions even without tax opinions,
but tax opinions, and the sophisticated tax advice that they often reflect, increase the like-
lihood that the taxpayer will end up in this penalty-free zone. See Johnson, supra note 11, at
949-51.
258. See supra Part III.B.2.a. (discussing this requirement and how it is applied in the tax
opinion context).
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lawyer’s advice, thereby making malpractice recovery less likely.259
Given that lawyers typically draft these provisions (including the
representations to which clients and third parties attest), a lawyer
can try to use the opinion-writing process to reduce the extent to
which she takes on the client’s risk of loss.260
Notwithstanding the fact that both the client and the government
bear part of the risk associated with the client’s tax position, the
opinion-writing lawyer still implicitly agrees to indemnify the client,
albeit partially and conditionally, if the client’s tax position, taken
in reliance on a tax opinion, is successfully challenged.
IV. THE INDEMNITY FUNCTION OF TAX OPINIONS AND THE 
REALITY OF TAX PRACTICE
Evidence about tax malpractice payouts and about attitudes
within the community of opinion writing tax lawyers provides in-
sight into how the indemnity theory of tax opinions resonates with
the realities of tax practice. Although it is extremely difficult to
obtain data, the limited evidence that is available suggests that the
risk to tax opinion writers is real.
259. See Rothman, supra note 11, at 363, 370-74. For example, a client’s position may fail,
and penalties may be imposed, not because the lawyer’s analysis was faulty (given the stated
assumptions, caveats, and representations), but rather because a client’s representation on
which the lawyer reasonably relied was untrue. In that case, the client should be unable to
recover unless the lawyer knew or had reason to know that the representation was false. See,
e.g., Kline v. First W. Gov’t Secs., Inc., 24 F.3d 480, 484-87 (3d Cir. 1994). That is, the “bells
and whistles” in the opinion enable the lawyer to raise various affirmative defenses to the
malpractice claim (for example, that the client made and signed false representations and so
has unclean hands; or that the proximate cause of the client’s damages are outside the stated
scope of the representation). See generally 3 MALLEN, supra note 158, ch. 22 (discussing
affirmative defenses to malpractice claims).
260. Another way to frame this is that the opinion-writing lawyer uses the limitations in
the opinion to shift to the client some of the lawyer’s risk that the lawyer is incorrect.
However, this Article is concerned with who bears the client’s risk (meaning the client’s
potential liability—back taxes, interest, and penalties—if the client’s tax position is
successfully challenged), and liability for a successfully challenged tax position falls on the
taxpayer (the client) who took the position. Hence, the text describes the function of the
opinion caveats as a method through which the lawyer ensures that the client retains some
of the client’s own risk, and through which the lawyer limits the extent to which she accepts
her client’s risks of back taxes, interest, and penalties. See supra note 29.
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A. Tax Malpractice Payouts as Evidence of the Indemnity
Function
Several high-profile tax malpractice claims against tax advisers
for bad tax opinions, particularly in the tax shelter context, resulted
in large payouts. For example, the Jenkens & Gilchrist matter
settled for over $80 million,261 and Sidley Austin Brown & Wood and
KPMG262 settled for over $154 million.263 As evidenced in these and
other published cases, opinion writers were required to provide in-
demnification for losses that arose from bad tax opinions.
Published cases, even accounting for the class action suits that
involved hundreds of plaintiffs,264 reflect only a subset of matters in
which tax opinion-writers provided indemnities for losses. Many
tax malpractice “disputes were subject to confidential, binding arbi-
tration”265 or were resolved by “settlement, or in non-reported
litigations.”266 Given the confidentiality of many of these matters,
“it’s impossible to know their costs,” but commentators note that
payouts were “significant,”267 and “plaintiffs prevailed in the major-
ity of these [tax shelter] cases.”268 Thus, providers of tax opinions
261. See Denney v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 250 F.R.D. 317, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
262. KPMG is an accounting firm and not a law firm. Caselaw regarding bad tax opinions
necessarily blurs the line between tax lawyers who provide opinions and tax accountants who
provide opinions because “[t]he dividing line between the work of the tax attorney and tax
accountant has always been murky,” and because both have been sued for malpractice over
tax opinions and provide compensation for losses. Todres IV, supra note 70, at 608. Thus, the
most prominent articles about tax malpractice cases consider cases against both tax lawyers
and tax accountants. See, e.g., id. However, where possible (for example, regarding mal-
practice insurance claims information), this Article tries to focus on evidence about tax
lawyers. Nevertheless, this Article’s observations about the indemnity function of tax opinions
likely extend to any professional who gives a tax opinion.
263. See Simon v. KPMG LLP, No. 05-CV-3189 (DMC), 2006 WL 1541048, at *3 (D.N.J.
June 2, 2006), stipulation amending settlement filed March 22, 2006; see also, e.g., Ling v.
Cantley & Sedacca, L.L.P., No. 04 Civ. 4566, 2006 WL 290477, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2006)
(settlement of over $4.5 million). See generally Soled, supra note 30, at 332-33 (tallying
malpractice cases involving tax shelters); Todres IV, supra note 70, at 625-50 (describing
several cases).
264. For example, there were 1100 clients in the Jenkens & Gilchrist settlement. See
Denney, 230 F.R.D. at 330.
265. Dellinger, supra note 203.
266. Todres IV, supra note 70, at 606; see also Soled, supra note 30, at 268 n.1.
267. Dellinger, supra note 203.
268. Soled, supra note 30, at 276.
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likely served an indemnity function in many matters that are not
publicly reported.
Some insights into the magnitude of the nonpublicly reported
indemnity payments can be gleaned from malpractice insurance
claims data,269 noting that the data reflect not only payouts in
connection with tax shelter opinions but also payouts made on
account of tax opinions and tax advising more generally.270 Unfortu-
nately, publicly available data about tax malpractice insurance
claims are relatively limited, and even when such data are avail-
able, the information is generally not parsed finely by and within
tax practice.271 Yet, some insights are available, as detailed below.
In the only tax-specific report about the malpractice insurance
claims experience that I could find, the Attorney’s Liability Assur-
ance Society (ALAS),272 which “is the insurer with the largest
market share in the medium- to large-firm [lawyers’ professional
liability] insurance market,”273 reported “an increase in significant
claims involving tax advice” over the several years leading up to
2011.274 ALAS’s report explicitly noted that a significant portion of
its reported tax malpractice matters are ones in which a legal opin-
ion was a “critical component”; these were often, but not always, tax
269. The malpractice insurance claims data technically reflect payments made by legal
malpractice insurers and not the lawyers who committed malpractice. However, the
malpractice liability is actually imposed on the lawyer, making the lawyer the primary
“insurer” of the client’s loss. The malpractice insurance claims data merely reflect claims
against those lawyers who had the foresight to obtain malpractice insurance, which operates
as reinsurance, pursuant which the lawyer herself is indemnified for the primary
indemnification liability that she owes to the client on account of the bad opinion. See 7
APPLEMAN, supra note 31, § 71.02.
270. See, e.g., ALAS, supra note 70, at 2, 4.
271. Baker & Swedloff provide the most comprehensive analysis of legal malpractice
insurance claims data to date, and their research required “considerable effort.” Baker &
Swedloff, supra note 253, at 1301. Even with all of the data that they compiled, they are able
to provide relatively little insight into tax-related claims given the manner in which the data
are reported. See, e.g., id. at 1307 n.90 (noting that ALAS did not report on Tax/ERISA claims
every year).
272. ALAS is an insurance company that specializes in providing lawyers with professional
liability insurance. The ALAS Story, ATTORNEYS’ LIABILITY ASSURANCE SOC’Y, http://www.
alas.com/public/the_alas_story.aspx [https://perma.cc/9W5F-UQWJ] (“ALAS is the country’s
largest lawyer-owned mutual, insuring more than 210 premier law firms with over 62,000
lawyers around the world.”).
273. Baker & Swedloff, supra note 253, at 1275.
274. ALAS, supra note 70, at 1 (“[M]ore than 20% of ALAS’s total gross incurred loss on tax
claims [throughout ALAS’s history] has occurred within the last five years alone.”).
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shelters.275 More generally, ALAS explained that “[b]oth the fre-
quency and severity of opinion-related claims have increased in
recent years. Many problematic opinion claims occur in specialized
practice areas, such as tax opinions.”276 While useful, there are
limits to the ALAS data. The ALAS data do not cover all tax
opinion-writing firms, and most notably, the ALAS data may under-
represent large New York and California firms as a result of ALAS’s
historic geographic restrictions that were lifted in 2000.277 Neverthe-
less, the ALAS experience with tax malpractice insurance claims,
particularly those based on tax opinions, supports this Article’s con-
tention that tax opinions can create costly indemnification obliga-
tions.
More general (not tax-specific) reports about malpractice
insurance claims data also support the assertion that there is a
meaningful risk of payouts because of tax opinions and other tax
advice. An example is data provided by Aon,278 which is “the
insurance brokerage company with the largest market share in the
lawyers professional liability insurance market.”279 In Aon’s 2015
report discussing malpractice insurance claims over the prior ten
years, Aon noted that “[s]ubstantive errors ranged from allegedly
faulty tax opinions to poor trial strategies. Some of these notifi-
cations were generated by unhappy clients with unrealistic expec-
tations, but others arose because the lawyer failed to comprehend
and apply the law properly. And many of these substantive errors
resulted in significant settlements.”280 That is, faulty tax opinions
275. Id. at 1-2. ALAS cites seventeen tax shelter claims involving tax opinions accounting
for “nearly $45 million of ALAS’s $70 million total incurred cost on tax claims during [the five
years leading up to the December 2011 report].” Id. at 2. ALAS notes, however, that they
“continue to see other [nonshelter] claims arising from the tax practice area as well. These
come from all manner of transactions.” Id. at 4.
276. Id. at 12.
277. See Baker & Swedloff, supra note 253, at 1284.
278. Aon has “over 75 years of history providing insurance to professional service firms
[such as lawyers],” and Aon’s “Professional Services practice represents more large profession-
al service firms than any other broker in the world.” Professional Services, AON RISK SOLS.,
http://www.aon.com/risk-services/professional-services/about-us.jsp [https://perma. cc/7AZH-
YHM8]. Aon’s law firm clients “may reasonably be classified as large law firms, but [they] also
serve numerous midsized firms, as well as some boutique firms.” RICHMOND ET AL., supra note
70, at 1.
279. Baker & Swedloff, supra note 253, at 1287.
280. RICHMOND ET AL., supra note 70, at 7.
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were important enough for Aon to call out explicitly as among the
types of problems that led to significant indemnification payments.
Malpractice insurance claims data also offer at least some support
for the notion that the indemnity function of opinions may have
more resonance in tax than in some other practice areas. For ex-
ample, Aon’s claims experience reveals that tax claims paid out
more frequently than claims in almost all other areas.281 Addition-
ally, Aon reported that when tax claims resulted in payouts, the
losses were relatively severe (approximately $668K median ground
up losses per claim paid and $2.7 million mean ground up losses per
claim paid, both ranking at sixth out of twenty-one practice
areas).282 Speaking more generally, Aon notes that “[t]ransactional
practices [which can include tax] are exponentially more susceptible
to severe claims than is litigation practice.”283 Some state-based
281. Tax practice had one of the highest ratios of claims paid to notifications (just under
33 percent). Id. at 3. Only two areas (Health Care and Government Affairs/Lobbying) had
higher ratios, but the numbers were much smaller; both had fewer total notifications than tax
had claims paid. See id. Moreover, one of those areas was flagged by Aon as an anomaly, with
claims and losses being “primarily the result of a single rogue lobbyist.” Id. at 4. Tax was not,
however, among the practice areas that generated the highest number of notifications. Id. at
4. This is not surprising, as tax is a much less common practice than many others, such as
corporate or litigation. Nevertheless, Aon notes that it can be difficult to interpret the
notification data because rates of notification could depend on the number of lawyers in Aon’s
client population and on different firms’ “sensitivity to the need to report to their insurers
circumstances that could lead to claims.” Id. at 2. Sometimes, lawyers report out of an
“abundance of caution” even if the notice does not “lead to losses of any sort.” Id. at 6.
282. See id. at 3, 5. In comparison, ALAS’s cumulative data put tax malpractice claims
(measured by mean gross loss per claim) more in the middle of the pack with other practice
areas, but even ALAS’s data reflected that tax claims resulted in slightly outsized payouts,
with Tax/ERISA claims constituting 5 percent of ALAS’s gross loss but only 4 percent of the
number of claims. See Baker & Swedloff, supra note 253, at 1308 (reporting on cumulative
ALAS data). The ABA Standing Committee on Lawyers’ Professional Liability also ranks tax
practice in the middle of the pack based on the number of claims in each practice area. AM.
BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS’ PROF ’L LIAB., PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE
CLAIMS 2008-2011 5 (2012). However, the Standing Committee itself notes that this
information cannot be used to determine which practices are high risk or low risk because the
data do not adjust for “how much of the practice of law is devoted to particular subject
matters,” nor do the data provide an indication of the severity of the claims by practice area.
Id. at 4. Thus, the ABA’s data are not probative for this Article’s inquiry.
283. RICHMOND ET AL., supra note 70, at 5. Aon attributes some of the concern in this area
to “representation of unworthy clients in corporate and transactional matters.” Id. at 11.
However, it is sometimes difficult to tell, when beginning a client engagement, whether a
client is unworthy. See generally DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, ABA, DISHONEST OR UNWORTHY
CLIENTS: PINK FLAGS (2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/profes
sional_responsibility/2018_cpr_meetings/2018conf/materials/session7_clients_go_
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malpractice insurance claims data similarly show tax as a practice
area on the higher end of malpractice claim success rates and mean/
median losses.284
Although the foregoing supports the contention that material fi-
nancial exposure can arise from bad tax opinions, the data are lim-
ited in several ways, including not being finely parsed enough to
distinguish between malpractice claims based on tax opinions and
claims based on other tax advice or reporting choices.285
However, some limits of the malpractice insurance claims data
likely understate the indemnity function of tax opinions. Aon notes
that its data may “materially underreport[ ]” malpractice liabilities
because, among other reasons, many claims remain open given that
“claims against law firms are typically long-tail events.”286 This is
likely to be equally true of ALAS’s data. Moreover, underreporting
of long-tail malpractice liability may be particularly common in tax
where the malpractice claim depends on the finality of the client’s
underlying dispute with the tax authority, which may only com-
mence several years after the initial tax filing and which can then
take many years to resolve.287 As a result, opinion writers’ indem-
nity obligations may be larger than the data reflect, particularly in
tax practice. In addition, although ALAS and Aon are huge players
in the professional liability insurance market, their data do not
cover all insured tax lawyers.288 Moreover, some lawyers and some
matters are not covered by malpractice insurance, in which cases
any malpractice/indemnification payouts made by such lawyers
would not be captured by the data made available by malpractice
insurers. Thus, tax opinions and advice likely result in more indem-
nification obligations than are reflected in the available legal mal-
practice insurance claims data.289
rogue/dishonest_client_pink_flags.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2T4-C6CS].
284. Herbert M. Kritzer & Neil Vidmar, When the Lawyer Screws Up: A Portrait of Legal
Malpractice Claims and Their Resolution, DUKE L. SCH. PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY, SER. NO.
2015-29, at 37-39, 45, 49 (July 7, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2627735 [https://perma.cc/
XYS5-VMB8] (analyzing Missouri and Florida claims data in particular).
285. See, e.g., id.
286. RICHMOND ET AL., supra note 70, at 1, 3.
287. See id.
288. See Baker & Swedloff, supra note 253, at 1301-02, 1312.
289. An even fuller picture of the indemnity obligations created by tax opinions could be
provided by also looking to the professional liability insurance claims against tax accountants,
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B. Tax Lawyers’ Perceptions About the Indemnity Function of Tax
Opinions
When assessing the extent to which the indemnity function of tax
opinions resonates in tax practice, it is useful to look beyond mal-
practice payout data to professional norms within the tax bar, which
reveal whether tax practitioners perceive a real risk of having to
make indemnification payments for bad opinions. However, just as
it was difficult to obtain good data about indemnification payouts
on bad tax opinions, it is difficult to get data about lawyers’ at-
titudes about the indemnity function of tax opinions. Lawyers are
understandably reluctant to discuss erroneous tax opinions ren-
dered by their firm, any payouts made in connection therewith, or
their internal firm attitudes about the possibility of payouts on bad
tax opinions. Nevertheless, commentary in articles about tax opin-
ions provides at least anecdotal evidence about tax lawyers’ percep-
tions of the risk that a tax opinion will result in an indemnification
obligation.
Published articles suggest that commentators perceive signifi-
cant downside risk from tax opinions. Comments include the follow-
ing: “when a formal [tax] opinion goes bad, it can go really bad.”290
“[I]n the right (or wrong) circumstances, legal opinion problems can
spell serious trouble—i.e., death—for a law firm.”291 “[I]t is useful to
remember that the client whose representative today urges that we
stretch to give a favorable opinion may tomorrow be replaced by a
merger successor or bankruptcy trustee” who seeks to sue for mal-
practice.292 “What practitioners have learned is that erstwhile
clients who have met with defeat at the hands of the IRS will likely
turn around and sue them.”293
When reflecting on the impact of the tax shelter malpractice cases
in particular, one commentator remarked, “[o]ne of the most pow-
and not just tax lawyers. However, given this Article’s emphasis on tax lawyers, the text and
analysis focus, to the extent possible, on claims of malpractice against lawyers rather than
accountants. 
290. Rothman, supra note 11, at 361.
291. Lipson, CBA, supra note 18, at 1201 (citing “recent high-profile lawsuits involving
disallowed tax shelters”).
292. Corneel, supra note 11, at 184.
293. Soled, supra note 30, at 287-88.
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erful and penetrating aspects of malpractice litigation is the mon-
etary punishment it inflicts upon wayward practitioners.... The
malpractice cases cast a long shadow over firms.”294 This commenta-
tor also noted that, after the tax shelter malpractice cases, “fear of
... being sued for malpractice” has affected tax practitioner be-
havior.295 Similarly, another commentator said that the tax shelter
malpractice cases “have taken a huge toll” and “have had serious
effects on firms[ ].”296 A third noted that “it is safe to conclude that
tax professionals who render incorrect opinions that an invalid tax
shelter is likely valid will most assuredly be the target of a tax mal-
practice suit brought by the disappointed purchaser of the tax
shelter”297 and that “[i]nvolvement with clients investing in tax
shelters seems to be deleterious to a tax professional’s malpractice
health.”298
More broadly, commentators caution that “[r]endering [tax]
opinions ... can be a hazardous activity”299 and that tax opinion-
givers should “[b]e careful out there.”300 Even in transactional prac-
tice generally, “lawyers perceive this risk [of being sued based on
opinion letters] to be increasing.”301 Indeed, a study about third-
party closing opinions (which are not tax opinions) found that
lawyers thought that, even in that context, they “were becoming
increasingly attractive litigation targets when transactions failed,
and that opinion letters would form an important link in the chain
leading to liability.”302
Not all commentators, however, agree that tax practitioners re-
gard seriously the risk of malpractice liability. For example, one
commentator dismissed the fear of malpractice suits as ineffective
294. Id. at 284-86 (primarily discussing tax shelter malpractice cases).
295. Id. at 306, 330 (making them “toe the compliance line” and making them “reluctant
to promote abusive tax shelters”).
296. Dellinger, supra note 203, at 219.
297. Todres IV, supra note 70, at 606.
298. Todres I, supra note 70, at 584 (footnotes omitted).
299. Woodward, supra note 11, at 4.
300. Wood, supra note 39, at 65.
301. Lillian Blackshear, Wait ... What Did I Just Say?: What Lawyers Need to be Concerned
About When Issuing Third-Party Closing Opinions, 10 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 71, 73
(2008) (citing Lipson, Price, supra note 18).
302. Lipson, Price, supra note 18, at 65.
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for keeping tax adviser behavior “within some bounds.”303 Instead,
the commentator explained that “[m]alpractice suits are no slam
dunk for the taxpayer” and that “[i]n private, the opinion writers
sometimes say they are confident that they can avoid any obligation
to clients if the position fails, provided they have put enough bells
and whistles on the opinion.”304
Others, however, pushed back against that characterization of
the tax profession.305 Moreover, that commentator’s focus was on
penalty protection opinions,306 where the magnitude of damages
payable in a malpractice action is generally less than that payable
on account of an opinion with higher confidence.307 In that context,
the seriousness with which practitioners regard malpractice liabil-
ity might be lower with opinions with very low levels of confidence
because of the lawyer’s lower potential financial exposure.308
Ultimately, remarks from published articles, while anecdotal,
suggest that many tax lawyers, including some with sufficient ex-
pertise with tax opinions to write about them, perceive the risk of
malpractice liability for bad tax opinions to be real. Even if there are
legal barriers to indemnification payouts, how lawyers perceive the
tax opinion relationship matters—and many perceive there to be a
real risk that they could have to indemnify the client if the tax
opinion is wrong.
* * * 
Information about tax malpractice payouts and commentary
about the perceived risk posed by tax opinions suggest that the in-
demnification function of tax opinions is part of the reality of tax
practice. Data suggest that tax malpractice claims can result in pay-
outs, and so tax opinion writers should be cautious about the po-
tential indemnification obligation they are accepting when writing
303. Johnson, supra note 11, at 948, 955.
304. Id.
305. See, e.g., Dellinger, supra note 203, at 219; Dennis B. Drapkin, Response to Ending
Reliance on Tax Opinion of Own Lawyer, 141 TAX NOTES 1353 (2013) (responding based on
his “long-time experience as a tax professional”).
306. Johnson, supra note 11, at 947-48.
307. See supra text accompanying notes 220-22.
308. See supra text accompanying notes 220-22.
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opinions. Commentary about professional attitudes suggests that
many are.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE INSURANCE ANALYSIS FOR TAX OPINIONS
The existence of an element of insurance (specifically, an in-
demnity obligation) in the relationship between a client and its tax
opinion-writing lawyer has important implications for the tax
profession. Tax lawyers might adopt insurance premium-style bill-
ing to tie their compensation to the value of the implicit indemnity
they are providing. Lawyers may also try to limit their potential
indemnification obligations by, among other things, changing the
terms of client engagements and changing how they prepare the tax
opinions. In addition, in the market for tax advice, clients may
change what they look for in lawyers, and lawyers may change how
they market themselves to clients. These are only some potential
consequences of the indemnity function of tax opinions. This Part
will briefly discuss these consequences.
A. Tax Lawyers’ Billing Practices
Increased awareness of the indemnity implied by a tax opinion
could lead lawyers to alter their historic billing practices. Lawyers
typically charge for their services based on billable hours expend-
ed.309 Some lawyers also use alternative fee structures, such as
value billing or flat-fee billing.310 Although alternative fee arrange-
ments are increasingly common in practice areas including trans-
actional practices,311 it is difficult to obtain insight into the extent
309. See Ani Krikorian, Billing Outside the Box, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 655, 655-59
(2014); Douglas R. Richmond, An Inconvenient Truth: There Is Nothing Wrong with the
Billable Hour, 19 PROF. LAW. 3, 3 (2009); see also Frank Strong, Key Metric: The Current Law
Firm Billing Rates by Practice Area, LEXISNEXIS: BUS. L. BLOG (Oct. 27, 2015), http://
businessoflawblog.com/2015/10/law-firm-billing-rates-2/ [https://perma.cc/YD5W-L8HM].
310. See generally HAZARD ET AL., supra note 155, § 9.19 (discussing alternative fee
arrangements); Committee on Lawyer Business Ethics, Business and Ethics Implications of
Alternative Billing Practices: Report on Alternative Billing Arrangements, 54 BUS. LAW. 175
(1998). 
311. See GEO. L. CTR. STUDY LEGAL PROF. & THOMSON REUTERS LEGAL EXECUTIVE IN-
STITUTE, 2017 REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE LEGAL MARKET 9-10, https://static/legalsolutions.
thompsonreuters.com/static/pdf/peer-monitor/8042201-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SEY-7B7M]
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to which alternative fee structures are used in tax opinion prac-
tice,312 but my sense from lawyers who practice tax is that hourly
billing remains the norm. In contrast, “[t]he premiums for [third-
party tax insurance], unlike fees typically charged by tax profession-
als for rendering tax opinions, are based on the financial exposure
and the estimated likelihood of liability.”313
If tax opinions are understood as providing some degree of in-
surance to the client, fee setting could be dramatically different. The
insurance-like features of opinions suggest that the opinion-writer’s
fee could be analogized to an insurance premium and perhaps
should be set not exclusively on hours expended, but perhaps should
instead be set at least partly using a premium-style approach—that
is, an approach based on the maximum indemnity the lawyer could
have to pay and on the likelihood that the lawyer would have to pay
that indemnity.314 This approach ties the lawyer’s fee to the risk-
adjusted value of the potential indemnity the lawyer provides. The
entire fee for a tax opinion would not have to be calculated this way,
but the insurance-like aspect of opinions suggests the use of a
premium-style fee, at least in part.315
1. Illustrations of the Relevance of Premium-Style Fees
Consider two hypotheticals illustrating the potential usefulness
of premium-style fees.
First, consider two matters involving the same tax issue, one of
which has potential loss of $5 million if the transaction fails to
qualify for tax-favorable treatment, and one of which has potential
loss of $500 million. Assume the matters are otherwise similar (for
(describing recent shifts in billing practices at law firms); Big Data: Steady But Subtle
Increase in AFA Use, LEXISNEXIS: BUS. L. BLOG (Dec. 8, 2015), http://businessoflawblog.com/
2015/12/increase-in-afas/ [https://perma.cc/DKU9-E2CB].
312. See, e.g., Big Data, supra note 311 (lumping tax together with corporate); Strong,
supra note 309 (doing the same).
313. Woodward, supra note 11, at 4; see also Wolfe, supra note 79, at 445-24 (“[T]he
premium depends upon the degree of risk involved and the dollar amount of the coverage
sought.”).
314. Wolfe, supra note 79, at 445-24; Woodward, supra note 11, at 4.
315. An alternative would be to adjust billing rates by type of matter, such that lawyers
who charge $X/hour for “regular” tax work might charge a premium rate at some multiple (for
example, $X*1.5/hour) for tax opinion work or other work with heightened indemnity risks.
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example, with respect to the tax analysis required, the time that
each will involve, and the level of certainty at which the tax opinion
will be rendered). The insurance paradigm suggests that the lawyer
might want to charge a (potentially significantly) higher fee for the
matter with the $500 million exposure. Charging a higher fee for the
higher-exposure matter does not seem unreasonable, and perhaps
this already happens for matters that are billed using a flat fee. But
what if the billing is hourly? Perhaps the lawyer would spend more
time on the second transaction because of the magnitude of the ex-
posure. If, however, the analyses for the two matters are very sim-
ilar, the additional time the lawyer might bill is quite unlikely to be
enough to compensate for the additional indemnity risk the lawyer
accepts by rendering the opinion on the matter with more ex-
posure.316
Second, consider a situation where a tax lawyer, after her initial
tax analysis, advises a client that she can opine at a particular level
of confidence, but the client pressures the lawyer to reach a higher
confidence level. Assume the lawyer endeavors to get to the higher
confidence level (for example, by putting in more work to make rec-
ommendations about how to change the transaction to achieve more
confidence or by looking for additional authority that could be used
to more strongly support the position on the unchanged transac-
tion). The insurance paradigm suggests that the lawyer would want
to charge more than merely the hourly billing rate for the additional
hours that it takes for the lawyer to get comfortable at the higher
level of confidence, given that the lawyer would be accepting the
additional risk associated with agreeing to render the opinion at a
higher level.
Some tax lawyers may think they would never succumb to such
pressure—that they would just say “no” and be done. But it is not
so easy; pressure can be part of the reality of practice. Clients
engage in “opinion shopping” and exert pressure on lawyers to reach
316. The lawyer’s hourly fees may already be set so that the high-exposure client is paying
approximately the “right” premium. Then, the low-exposure client would be dramatically
overpaying for the indemnity and would be better off seeking other counsel, unless the lawyer
was willing to reduce the fee. Moreover, if the low-exposure client does not seek other counsel
and if the lawyer does not reduce the fees to account for the situation, then the lawyer runs
the risk that she is charging unreasonable or even unconscionable fees, possibly in violation
of Model Rule 1.5. See MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT r. 1.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
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the client’s desired conclusion.317 This can include explicitly
“threatening to take business elsewhere” and playing lawyers from
different law firms against each other.318 Tax lawyers can also get
internal pressure from corporate/finance colleagues not to get in the
way of a deal with momentum.319 And these pressures could even
lead tax lawyers to give opinions that “might not be totally 100%
right” just to keep the transaction alive,320 though doing so is highly
inadvisable. People may have different views on the prevalence of
“opinion shopping” and client pressure about opinion levels, but
these pressures can be real. Acknowledging the opinion’s indemnity
function and using a premium-style fee can be part of a tax lawyer’s
response.
Perhaps lawyers do not need to charge additional premium-style
fees in situations like the hypotheticals because the lawyers are
already getting compensated in other ways for taking on the addi-
tional risk. This compensation could come in the form of retaining
the client’s current work, obtaining the client’s future work,321 or
even being associated with the particular client or with transactions
of such magnitude or importance.322 However, if this is the risk/
compensation tradeoff that a lawyer is making, she should be aware
that it is occurring and make an intentional choice, understanding
the stakes.
Ultimately, the more compelling the insurance paradigm is for a
particular tax opinion matter, the more a lawyer should consider
using a premium-style fee for the opinion.
317. Fleischer, supra note 9, at 266-67; see also Johnson, supra note 11, at 959 (citing
Report on Corporate Tax Shelters, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N (Apr. 29, 1999)) (discussing pressure
on tax professionals to “give favorable opinions”).
318. Fleischer, supra note 9, at 266-67.
319. See id. at 267.
320. Suchman & Cahill, supra note 16, at 695-96 (quoting a nontax lawyer recounting an
anecdote about an opinion regarding intellectual property rights); see also Fleischer, supra
note 9, at 266-67. 
321. Cf. Fleischer, supra note 9, at 267 (“In the old days, clients tended to rely on a single
firm as outside counsel for most deals. This is less true today. ‘Clients now use 100 different
law firms. You have to fight for every piece of business.’”(footnote omitted)).
322. Lawyers can gain prestige and reputation from the number and value of deals on
which they advise. See, e.g., M&A Law Firms Power Rankings, DEAL (2018), http://www.the
deal.com/league-tables/ma/ [https://perma.cc/MPT2-FFFD] (publishing “Deal Power Rankings”
that rank firms based on these metrics).
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2. Questions Raised by Premium-Style Fees
The use of premium-style fees for tax opinions could, however,
raise ethical questions. This Part addresses a few such questions by
analyzing whether premium-style fees are likely allowed at all, and
by discussing some other potential consequences of using premium-
style fees.
a. Are Premium-Style Fees for Tax Opinions Allowed?
Both the Model Rules and Circular 230 limit the types of fees that
tax lawyer can use, but neither is likely to prohibit the use of pre-
mium-style fees for tax opinions. Model Rule 1.5, which provides
rules regarding lawyer fees, would likely allow the use of a pre-
mium-style, risk-based flat fee if the fee is set reasonably and
clearly communicated to the client.323 A premium-style flat fee is
merely a variation on an allowable flat value-based fee, in that the
client is paying the lawyer a fixed amount based on the expected
value of the protection from damages that the tax opinion
provides.324
The analysis under Circular 230 is more complex because
Circular 230 raises two key questions about the permissibility of
premium-style fees: are they prohibited “contingent fees”? And are
they prohibited because they are based partly on the taxpayer’s
audit risk? Both questions are analyzed below.
Circular 230 generally prohibits contingent fees in tax matters.325
Circular 230 defines contingent fee as a
323. MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT r. 1.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). This assumes that the
lawyer would clearly communicate with the client the potential impact of such a fee structure,
including the possibility that the client would be precluded from relying on the opinion for
penalty protection purposes. See infra notes 346-49 and accompanying text. Some states
depart from Model Rule 1.5, so lawyers should, of course, check the ethics rules applicable in
their jurisdictions. See AM. BAR ASS’N CPR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE, VARIATIONS
OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT r. 1.5: FEES (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc_1_5.pdf
[https://perma.cc/385K-YUBB] (identifying state-by-state deviations from Model Rule 1.5).
324. See generally Kasey W. Kincaid & Kimberly J. Walker, Managing Litigation Costs:
The Client Cannot Start Too Soon, 41 DRAKE L. REV. 67, 78 (1992) (discussing value-based
fees).
325. Circular 230 § 10.27(b) (generally prohibiting “contingent fees” except in specified
circumstances, which generally involve controversy matters).
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fee that is based ... on whether or not a position taken on a tax
return or other filing avoids challenge ... or is sustained. [This
includes a fee that is] based on a percentage of the refund
reported on a return, that is based on a percentage of taxes
saved, or that otherwise depends on the specific result at-
tained.326
However, a premium-style fee is unlikely to run afoul of this pro-
hibition.
A premium-style fee for a tax opinion would technically be based
on the amount of the indemnifiable loss for which the lawyer might
be liable, and not on the taxpayer’s anticipated or realized tax sav-
ings.327 Indemnifiable damages may, in some circumstances, include
the taxpayer’s anticipated tax savings, but the indemnifiable
damages may be larger (because of interest, penalties, corrective
costs, et cetera) or smaller (because the additional taxes owed by the
taxpayer may be excluded).328 Because the indemnifiable loss is not
coextensive with the taxpayer’s anticipated tax savings and almost
certainly includes amounts (such as corrective costs) other than the
taxpayer’s anticipated tax savings, a premium-style fee based on the
indemnifiable loss is unlikely to be a prohibited “contingent fee.”
Even to the extent that the premium-style fee is regarded as
based partly on the taxpayer’s anticipated tax savings, the fee is un-
likely to be a “contingent fee” within the meaning of the Circular
230 prohibition because a premium-style fee is fixed and does not
vary depending on whether the tax savings are ultimately sus-
tained. Because the amount of the fee does not change based on
whether the tax position succeeds,329 such a fee is not “based ...
on whether or not a position taken on a tax return or other filing
avoids challenge ... or is sustained ... [,]” is not “based on a per-
centage of taxes saved,” and does not “otherwise depend[ ] on the
specific result attained.”330 The fee could be based partly on the
taxes that the taxpayer and lawyer hope will be saved as a result
326. Id. § 10.27(c)(1).
327. See supra note 314 and accompanying text (explaining premium-style fees for tax
opinions would be based on maximum indemnity that could have to be paid).
328. See supra Part III.B.2.b. 
329. See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
330. Circular 230 § 10.27(c)(1).
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of the tax planning, but a premium-style fee would never be based
on the taxed that are actually saved.331 That is, the fee is not based
on whether the position is challenged or sustained or whether a spe-
cific result is attained.332 Thus, where the client pays the same fee
regardless of the ultimate result, the fee is unlikely to be a prohib-
ited “contingent fee.”
There is also a question of whether a premium-style fee could be
a prohibited “contingent fee” as a fee “based on a percentage of the
refund reported on a return.”333 However, the tax position analyzed
in the opinion is typically only one of many items relevant to the
amount of a refund (or amount due) reported on a return. That is,
the fee may be based partly on the tax treatment of one item rel-
evant to the taxpayer’s tax bill, but it is unlikely to be based on the
amount of the refund itself.334 Moreover, even if the taxpayer’s
refund is determined solely based on the tax savings on the matter
on which the opinion is rendered, the fee is still quite unlikely to be
“a percentage of the refund reported on the return.” This is because,
as explained above, the fee is based on a percentage of the indem-
nifiable loss, and the indemnifiable loss is neither coextensive with
nor determined as a percentage of a refund reported on a return.335
Thus, the premium-style fee is unlikely to be prohibited as a
contingent fee based on “a percentage of the refund reported on a
return.”336
Circular 230’s “contingent fee” rule also prohibits “any fee ar-
rangement in which the practitioner will reimburse the client for all
or a portion of the client’s fee in the event that [the client’s] position
... is not sustained.”337 A client who pays a premium-style fee might
be indemnified for its losses via the malpractice rules, which could
include the fee.338 However, the possibility that the client might be
reimburse[d] for the fee should not make the fee a “contingent fee”
for purposes of Circular 230 because it is unknown if the client “will
331. See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
332. Circular 230 § 10.27(c)(1).
333. Id.
334. See supra notes 314, 327-28 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 314, 327-28 and accompanying text.
336. Circular 230 § 10.27(c)(1).
337. Id.
338. See supra Part III.B.2.b.
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[be] reimburse[d]” for the fee.339 As discussed herein, malpractice
recovery is far from certain even if the tax opinion is wrong.340
Therefore, it is far from certain that the client would be reimbursed
for the fee even if the tax position is successfully challenged.
Ultimately, although there are questions, it is unlikely that pre-
mium-style fees for tax opinions would be “contingent fees” within
the meaning of Circular 230’s prohibition.
The second question about whether premium-style fees are allow-
ed under Circular 230 arises because Circular 230 prohibits tax
practitioners, when “evaluating a Federal tax matter, [from]
tak[ing] into account the possibility that a tax return will not be
audited or that a matter will not be raised on audit.”341 The use of
a premium-style fee is unlikely to violate this prohibition for two
reasons. First, a premium-style fee would be based upon the prob-
ability that the opinion writer would be obligated to indemnify the
client for losses.342 That probability depends partly on the risk of
audit and the risk that an issue is raised on audit, but it also
depends on many other things, including the likelihood that the
position will be sustained on the merits if challenged and, if the
position is not sustained, the likelihood that the lawyer will have
breached the standard of care.343 Second, to the extent that the tax
advisor is taking account of the possibility of an audit/challenge, she
is doing so only for purposes of setting the fee for the advice344 and
not for purposes of “evaluating a Federal tax matter.”345 That is,
even if audit risk is part of the fee analysis, the audit risk is not
considered when evaluating the substantive tax analysis or when
providing the tax advice to the client. Thus, although the analysis
is not certain, it is unlikely that an opinion writer would be pre-
cluded from using a premium-style fee because of Circular 230’s
prohibition on taking audit risk into account when evaluating a
Federal tax matter.
339. Circular 230 § 10.27(c)(1) (emphasis added).
340. See supra Part III.B.2.
341. Circular 230 § 10.37(a)(2)(vi).
342. See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
343. See supra Part III.B.2.a.
344. See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
345. Circular 230 § 10.37(a)(2)(VI).
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b. Other Concerns About Premium-Style Fees
Additional concerns could arise from the use of a premium-style
fee for tax opinions. For example, a premium-style fee could prevent
a client from relying on the tax opinion for penalty protection
purposes because the fee might create a conflict of interest for the
lawyer, meaning that the advice might not be sufficiently objective
so that it could be reasonably relied upon in good faith.346 However,
a fee that is calculated as a premium—based on the risk and
magnitude of the potential indemnification obligation—might not
present the same conflict as the higher than normal fee in 106 Ltd.
v. Commissioner.347 If the fee is carefully calibrated to accurately
price the lawyer’s financial exposure,348 the fee arguably should not
create an extra incentive (or disincentive) for the lawyer. In com-
parison, a flat fee that is set without regard to (and possibly much
higher than) the lawyer’s financial exposure would create such an
incentive. Whether a fee can be sufficiently carefully calibrated is,
of course, a question.
Moreover, there is a possibility that, regardless of how the fee is
calculated, a tax adviser that is “intricately involved in planning
[the] transaction ... has an ‘inherent and obvious conflict of interest’”
such that the adviser’s advice cannot be relied upon for penalty
protection.349 In that case, switching to a premium-style fee would
not necessarily reduce the client’s ability to rely on the adviser for
penalty protection.
Another concern with a premium-style fee is that it could increase
the likelihood of malpractice liability if the opinion is wrong. An
increased chance of malpractice liability could arise if the fee
provides the lawyer with “a strong incentive to provide the opinion
necessary to assure that the transaction will proceed, regardless of
346. See Johnson, supra note 11, at 952 (citing 106 Ltd. v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 67, 81 (2011))
(discussing the court’s conclusion that “the opinion could not be relied on because the
accounting firm charged ... more than its usual fee, indicating that the fee was ‘the firm’s cut
for helping to make the deal happen’”); Michelle M. Kwon, Dysfunction Junction: Reasonable
Cause and Good Faith Reliance on Tax Advisors with Conflicts of Interest, 67 TAX LAW. 403,
405 (2014); Lang, supra note 197; Lang, supra note 179 (citing Canal Corp. v. Comm’r, 135
T.C. 1999 (2010)).
347. 136 T.C. at 81; see also Johnson, supra note 11, at 952 (discussing the case).
348. See generally supra note 314 and accompanying text; supra Part V.A.1.
349. Lang, supra note 197.
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what an objective analysis of the transaction would conclude.”350 In
such a situation, the “trier of fact in a malpractice action, observing
this conflict, may be more inclined to find the opinion itself negli-
gent, if not intentionally misleading.”351 But again, it is not clear
that a premium-style fee creates such an incentive, especially if
carefully calibrated. Nonetheless, there is some risk.
The foregoing discussion is not exhaustive. Additional concerns
about the use of premium-style fees could arise.352 Ultimately,
despite concerns, a tax opinion giver should consider using a
premium-style fee particularly for matters where the indemnity
function of tax opinions resonates strongly.
B. Terms of Client Engagements
The tax advisor may also want to reduce the likelihood that she
will have to make an indemnity payment at all. One way to do that
would be by altering the terms of the initial engagement agree-
ment353 to prospectively limit the advisor’s potential malpractice
exposure.354 The Model Rules allow lawyers to “make an agreement
prospectively limiting the lawyer’s liability to a client for malprac-
tice” but only if “the client is independently represented in making
the agreement.”355 Although some states prohibit such agree-
ments,356 other states allow a lawyer to limit potential malpractice
350. Lang, supra note 179.
351. Id.; see also Lang, supra note 197.
352. See infra Part V.E. In addition, it is possible, but unlikely, that a premium-style fee
could cause a transaction to be reportable as subject to “contractual protection” under the
Treasury Regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(4). This is unlikely for the same reasons
that explain why a premium-style fee is unlikely to be a prohibited contingent fee for purposes
of Circular 230. See supra Part V.A.2.a. 
353. See generally Marian C. Rice, Engagement Letters: Beginning a Beautiful Relationship,
39 LAW PRAC., May/June 2013, at 14; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT r. 1.5 cmt.
2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (indicating the “desirab[ility]” of at least having a “written statement
concerning the terms of the engagement”).
354. Note that a prospective contractual limitation on the tax advisor’s malpractice liability
does not affect either the advisor’s duties under Circular 230 or potential sanctions there-
under.
355. MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(h) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). The comments to
Model Rule 1.8(h) cast doubt on some clients’ abilities to evaluate a request limiting a lawyer’s
malpractice liability. Id. r. 1.8(h) cmts. 14-15.
356. See, e.g., N.Y. RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(h)(1) (2018) (prohibiting prospective
agreements that limit malpractice liability).
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liability by agreement with the client.357 Such an agreement would
typically be made in the engagement letter at the beginning of the
representation.358 However, liability-limiting agreements seem un-
likely, partly because
It is hard to imagine a situation in which independent counsel
would advise a client that it was prudent to enter into such an
agreement—why should a client trust his affairs to a lawyer who
so clearly lacked confidence in his own abilities (at least with
respect to the matter in question)?359
Clients in some contexts, however, have agreed to such limita-
tions. For example, the former owner of the Detroit Pistons, who
engaged Deloitte in connection with his estate plan, agreed to limit
the period in which a malpractice claim could be brought to one
year, and the court upheld this contractual limitation.360 That case
involved tax malpractice by nonlawyers,361 and it is likely to be more
difficult for lawyers to impose such limits. Nevertheless, the
insurance paradigm discussed herein suggests that the more
concerned a tax opinion giver is about the risk of having to pay an
indemnity on account of a malpractice claim arising from a tax
opinion, the more the lawyer might want to try to limit her malprac-
tice exposure prospectively, even if doing so is difficult under the
ethical rules.362
C. The Design of Tax Opinions
Another way for the opinion writer to reduce her chances of
making an indemnity payment is to adjust her approach to the tax
357. See generally AM. BAR ASS’N CPR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE, supra note 156
(identifying state-by-state deviations from Model Rule 1.8).
358. See Rice, supra note 353, at 14.
359. HAZARD ET AL., supra note 155, § 13.33.
360. Aaron v. Deloitte Tax LLP, No. 653203, 2016 WL 4430495, at *7-9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2016), aff’d, 149 A.D.3d 580 (2017).
361. See id.
362. If the lawyer is so keen on limiting her malpractice exposure because of her lack of
competence in the complex subject matter or because of her distrust of an unworthy
prospective client, she should decline the matter. See MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT r. 1.1
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (competence); see also supra note 283 (discussing unworthy clients). 
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opinion. The most obvious way to do this is by working even harder
to ensure that she is exercising appropriate care and meeting the
highest standards of practice when rendering tax opinions.363
A different, more self-serving, strategy is merely to add more
“bells and whistles” to the tax opinion.364 Tax opinions are already
limited by various assumptions and caveats, and already rely on
representations from clients and others.365 These provisions narrow
the scope of the lawyer’s advice and, thus, constrain the lawyer’s
potential liability if the position is successfully challenged,366
thereby ensuring that the client itself retains some of the risk of loss
from a position that is successfully challenged.367 These limitations
are already perceived by some as a way to “avoid any obligation to
clients if the position fails.”368
A lawyer who is increasingly aware of, and concerned about, the
potential indemnity implied by a tax opinion might add even more
assumptions and caveats to the opinion. She might also ask the
client and others to make a larger number of even more comprehen-
sive representations on which the tax opinion will rely. By pushing
more relevant information into representations and assumptions,
the lawyer can try to offload responsibility for their contents,
thereby limiting the scope of her work and limiting her indemnity
obligation if the tax position is not sustained.369 This strategy could
be available as long as reliance on the assumptions and representa-
tions is reasonable,370 the lawyer is still behaving competently and
diligently,371 and the lawyer is still communicating clearly with the
client about the terms of the engagement, the advice, and the import
of the advice.372 There are limits to this strategy because responsibil-
ity for the core legal analysis must stay with the lawyer, lest the
lawyer perform no service at all.373 However, particularly in contexts
363. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
364. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
365. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 169-70, 259-60 and accompanying text.
367. See supra notes 169-70, 259-60 and accompanying text.
368. Johnson, supra note 11, at 948, 955.
369. See supra notes 169-70, 257-58.
370. See Circular 230 §§ 10.33(a)(2), 10.37(a)(2)(i), (a)(3).
371. See id. §§ 10.22, 10.35.
372. See id. § 10.33(a)(1), (3).
373. See Rothman, supra note 11, at 373-74.
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where the indemnity function of tax opinions resonates most
strongly, it would be unsurprising to see lawyers add more bells and
whistles to tax opinions to limit the potential indemnity obligations.
Ultimately, the more sensitized lawyers become to the potential
indemnity function of tax opinions, the more that lawyers are likely
to do to curtail this function, and the less that tax opinions will
ultimately serve this function. That is, the more impactful this
Article becomes, the less its core observation—that tax opinion
writers serve as potential indemnifiers—may end up being true.
D. The Market for Tax Advice
The insurance paradigm for understanding the function of tax
opinions may also affect how clients select counsel and how lawyers
market themselves to clients. Specifically, the indemnity function
of tax opinions suggests additional factors that clients should
consider when hiring a firm to provide a tax opinion. When hiring
a lawyer, prospective clients typically consider expertise, experience,
reputation, rapport, and billing rates, among many other things.374
However, if one of the functions of a tax opinion is to provide the
client with possible indemnification for damages, a prospective
client should also consider (1) whether the firm has the financial
strength to pay on any indemnity claim375 (including the firm’s
malpractice insurance coverage), (2) how combative or cooperative
the firm is likely to be if an indemnity claim is made (including the
ease/difficulty of the process of making such a claim), and (3) the
amount the client will pay in exchange for a certain type of assur-
ance.376
A focus on these types of factors could change the information
that clients and lawyers seek during the hiring process. For
example, clients who appreciate the potential indemnity function of
tax opinions would be more likely to ask about the firm’s malprac-
tice insurance coverage, and lawyers would need to be more
prepared to disclose this information. Information requests could
374. See e.g., Okamoto, supra note 2, at 18 (discussing the importance of reputation).
375. See Wolfe, supra note 79, at 445-23 (when shopping for insurance generally, “the
financial strength of the Insurer is a critical consideration”).
376. See generally supra note 316 and accompanying text.
2182 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:2111
go the other direction too. For example, a lawyer who is concerned
about potential indemnity exposure might, when considering wheth-
er to represent a new client, ask whether the prospective client has
ever sued a prior lawyer for malpractice. Ultimately, more pre-
engagement disclosure about malpractice insurance coverage and
other related matters (for example, average speed of resolution of
malpractice claims and history of malpractice claims) could become
more common as clients and lawyers develop greater appreciation
for the indemnity function of tax opinions.
In addition, states might consider making its requirements about
lawyers’ malpractice insurance coverage more rigorous.377 States
could, for example, require more malpractice coverage or more
disclosure about malpractice coverage. In particular, such require-
ments could target lawyers in specialized practice areas, such as
tax, where the indemnity function of opinions might have particular
resonance.378
Of course, the client would prefer that a tax opinion is correct,
and the desired tax treatment is achieved, such that no malprac-
tice/indemnity claim is made.379 This is, implicitly, part of one of the
key factors relevant today when a client chooses an attorney; clients
want to know if their lawyer will provide good advice.380 Thus,
attorneys seeking clients emphasize their expertise and their ability
to advise clients well. To bolster a law firm’s argument that a client
should choose the firm, the firm might also want to share data
about, for example, its low rate of malpractice claims, thereby
helping to establish that the firm’s advice is less likely to result in
a potential indemnification claim than the advice of other firms.
Ultimately, how the market for tax lawyers might change due to
the indemnity framework depends on how strongly the indemnity
function of advice resonates with clients and lawyers, and under
377. Most states do not require lawyers to tell clients about the lawyer’s malpractice
coverage. See Kritzer & Vidmar, supra note 284, at 71-76 app. 1 (detailing state-by-state
malpractice insurance disclosure requirements); see also HAZARD ET AL., supra note 155, at
13-84 to 13-85 (lamenting that clients often do not know what resources are available to pay
judgments against lawyers).
378. See, e.g., NEV. RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT r. 7.4(d)(2)(iii) (Feb. 5, 2018) (imposing
higher malpractice coverage requirements for lawyers who communicate that they are
“specialists”).
379. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
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what circumstances. At the very least, understanding tax opinions
as implicit indemnity agreements raises important additional
questions for clients and lawyers to consider asking each other when
deciding whether and how to work together.
E. Conclusion About the Consequences of the Insurance 
Construct for Tax Opinions
There are more potential consequences of viewing tax opinions
through an insurance lens. For example, additional questions in-
clude: in what situations might conceiving of the tax lawyer’s role
as an indemnifier (and possibly using premium-style fees) pose a
“significant risk that the representation ... will be materially limited
by ... a personal interest of the lawyer,”381 (which would be problem-
atic under Model Rule 1.7(a)(2))? And if a tax opinion writer really
wanted to embrace the indemnity function of a tax opinion, how far
could she go with explicit terms of “insurance” in an engagement
letter, without becoming subject to regulation as an insurer and
without violating Circular 230 or the Model Rules? The answers to
these questions (and more) are beyond the scope of this Article.
However, the forgoing helps to illustrate that the insurance-like
aspect of tax opinions can have many potential consequences, which
can affect fundamental aspects of the lawyer-client relationship.
CONCLUSION
Tax lawyers, by providing tax opinions, provide an element of
insurance—a limited and conditional indemnity—to their clients.
Understanding the role of tax lawyers through the insurance lens
can have significant implications for the relationship between the
tax lawyer and her client. Lawyers and clients ignore the indemnity
aspect of their relationship at their peril.
Policymakers should also consider the implications of the in-
surance paradigm. Is this insurance-like role of tax lawyers good
or bad for society? Does the tax lawyer’s insurance-like role en-
hance tax compliance and decrease enforcement costs? Or does
381. MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
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the insurance-like role embolden taxpayers to take more aggressive
positions and embolden tax lawyers to provide more aggressive ad-
vice? Can (and should) the laws governing malpractice liability be
adjusted, particularly given the lawyer’s insurance-like role, to en-
hance compliance and enforcement and inhibit aggressive behavior?
And if so, how would such changes affect the pricing and availability
of malpractice insurance, the frequency and costs of malpractice
claims, and more broadly, the economics of the legal profession, the
nature of the attorney-client relationship, and the availability and
cost of legal services? This Article provides the foundation for en-
gaging with these important questions.
